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During the past five years of both direct and indirect association
with the Hilitary Assistance Program, the writer has becorae increasingly
aware of the need for a greater understanding of this extremely complicated
aspect of our national defense. Although military assistance has been the
subject of numerous studies, very few if any, have viewed the functioning and
management of the program in light of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961—the
first complete revision of mutual security legislation since 1954.
It is the purpose of this paper to present in one document, an overall
vies? of the past, present and future of military assistance with particular
emphasis on the so-called new approach with new concepts in program
management. It is Intended to provide an insight into the program's strengths
as well as Its weaknesses.
The views expressed herein, except where specifically acknowledged,
are those of the writer and do aoi reflect those of the Department of Defense
or any agency thereof. This paper does not contain data or material of a
classified nature.
Appreciation Is extended to all those who gave valuable counsel and
assistance to the writer in obtaining data and reference materials so
necessary in the development of this paper. In particular, sincere thanks
II

are expressed to Colonel Aubrey P. Nathan, Mr. W, A. Comer, and Mrs. Betsy
White all of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International
Security Affairs) ; Ccraaander Lewis 0. Statith, Foreign Military Assistance
Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; Lieutenant CocEtander
Anthony H. Catanach, MAP Accounting and Beporting Branch, Bureau of Supplies
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MILITARY ASSISTANCE—INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY
Military assistance, no longer regarded as a tes^orary or interim
measure, is a major means by which the United States contributes to the
security of the free world. The furnishing of military equipment, training,
supplies and services to selected foreign military forces is an integral
and essential part of our own defense posture as well as that of the nations
and peoples with wham we are joined in the coswon cause of freedom.
^
By means of the Military Assistance Program (MAP), 3 the United States
and its allies obtain the military strength of over sixty-nine nations and
growing numbers of armed taen strategically positioned throughout the world
standing ready to meet the challenge posed by the build-up in Comnunlst power.
More specifically, our military assistance serves a three-fold purpose: it
enables free and independent nations to protect their internal security; it
Itf. S., Congress, Senate, The Special Committee to Study the Foreign
Aid Program, Letter of Transmittal , 35th Cong., 1st Seas., 1957. A report
prepared for the coirsr.ittee by the Systems Analysis Corporation, Washington,
D. C.
""Hon. Robert S. McNataara, Secretary of Defense, in testimony before
the Senate hearings on Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations
for 1962. See U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hearings .
on H. R. 9033, 87th Cong., 1st Seas., 1961, p. 141.
JL-
"^Frequently used terms will appear with abbreviations ieaaediately
following in parentheses. Thereafter the term may be referred to by
abbreviation only. A list of these abbreviations is contained in Appendix I.

2deters local wars by making them clearly unprofitable} and it plays a
significant part, especially in NATO, in deterring any resort to general
war.
^
Succinctly stated, the Immediate purpose of military assistance is to
increase the ability of free T.7orld nations to defend themselves; however, the
ultimate purpose is to enhance the security position of the United States—
a fact that is not concealed from recipient nations.
Proflraq, Devej-qpnent;
Although it is difficult to specify the beginning of foreign aid
per se » it is generally recognised that military assistance began with
President Truman's decision in 1947, to furnish military aid to Greece and
Turkey. It was on March 12, 1947, that President Truman enunciated the
Truman Doctrine before a joint session of Congress, and requested an
appropriation of $400 million for military and economic aid to these countries.
In justifying his reouast before Congress, the President declared that the
national security of the United States was involved and that *'it must be the
foreign policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting
attempted subjugation hy armed minorities or by outside pressures.""1
^Hon. Robert S. llcftamara, Secretary of Defense, in statement before
the Senate hearings on International Development and Security, See U. S.
Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign delations, Hearings » on S. 1933,
87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, p. 594.
^Message from the President (Truman) to a joint session of Congress,
March 12, 1947, quoted in Dennett, Raymond, and Robert K. Turner, ed.
Documents on American Foreign Relations (Princeton University Press, 1947),
IK, 646.
»i
3Actually, the event which precipitated President Truman's action was
the receipt of a communique from the British Government on February 24, 1947,
which said, ir. effect, that because of increasing financial difficulties,
Britain would be forced to stop practically all aid to Greece and Turkey
after March 31, of that year. The communique reminded Che President of the
continuing Soviet pressures on these countries, and expressed the hope that
the United States could carry on in view of the 1946 Anglo-American
agreements which declared that for "military and strategic reasons" Turkey
and Greece should not be allowed to fall under Soviet control. The actual
strategic and military justifications for the Greek-Turkish aid program were
not made public because it was feared that the American people, not
accustomed to thinking along these lines during peacetime, might become so
alarmed as to defeat the bill. As finally amended the Greek-Turkish aid
bill was passed by Congress on April 22, 1947, as an emergency "one-shot"
program providing $300 million for both economic and military aid to Greece
and $100 million which was to be used exclusively for strengthening Che
military forces of Turkey.'
The Greek-Turkish Aid Act of 1947, although not realised at the t_
gave birth to the Cold War and launched a program of using American mc
and material as a means of opposing indirect Soviet aggression in foreign
U. 3. Congress, House, U. S, Foreign Aid . Document Ifo. 116, £6th
Cong., 1st Sess., June, 1939, p. 28.
'U. S. Congress, An Act to Provide for Assistance, to Greece and
Turkey , Public Law 75, GOtli Cong., 1st Sesa. ( 1247.
^Eugene W. Castle, The Great Giveaway . (Chicago: Henry Hegnery Co.,
1957), p. 15.

4countries which were friendly to the United States. This act gave blanket
authority to the President, who in turn, delegated the responsibility for
administering the program to the Department of State.
Hardly had the ink dried on our eossnitxaents to Greece and Turkey
when, because of increasing world tensions, it became apparent that both the
economic and military assistance programs of the United States should be
significantly expanded. The Marshall flan resulted with the Greek-Turkish
aid program being merged into the planning and administration of the European
Recovery Program (Marshall Plan) in the summer of 1948. As originally
conceived, the Marshall Plan, which was implemented by the Economic
Cooperation Act, y was not an anti-Coimaunist program as had been the Truman
Doctrine, but rather a relief and reconstruction project for any country
willing to adhere to the purposes of the act.
Consideration of The Economic Cooperation Act is pertinent to the
history and development of MAP for two primary reasons; (1) it brought to an
cod the Greek-Turkish aid program, and (2) it created the Economic
Cooperation Administration which was soon to divert its attention from
economic recovery to that of expediting a quick build-up of military
strength in Europe. This radical change in the mission of the EGA was
brought about by a Russian campaign of aggression designed to counteract
such progress as had been made by the Marshall Plan.
i n n. mu ll i ii n I urn im ""»
%. S. Congress, Title I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 ,
Public Law 472, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948.
^U. S. Congress, House Document No. 116, op. cit . , p. 33.

5BCA had to change rapidly from a cloaehnit organisation
dealing with a specified range of economic goals into a more
diffused administration increasingly subordinated to military
and political objectives and to the organs of government
primarily responsible for their pursuits.**
Russia moved fast in its attempts to undermine Western unity. First,
in February, 1943, the Communists took over control of Czechoslovakia. In
the summer and fall of 1948, an effort was made to seal off Berlin from the
Jt, and in 1949, the Communists overran the entire mainland of China.
"It was obvious that Russia was determined not to permit the Marshall Plan
to work."12
Although the wheels turned exceedingly slowly, the West's ultimate
answer to the intensified Soviet: threat was the Horth Atlantic Treaty and
the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. The Jfortfc Atlantic Treaty, which
established the Uorth Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was signed by the
United States and eleven European non»Communist states on April 4, 1049,
and ratified by Congress on July 2$, 1949. On this same day, President
Truman requested legislation that would authorise "military aid to free
nations to enable them to protect themselves against the threat of
aggression. 3 In other words, authority was requested to underwrite liATO
by supplying arms and equipment to our allies beyond their own capability .
. »»———«»— »«»«»««»i« i 1 ma i m il m»»—»»-«. i , i | i i n i r i n i , n i i. i
UH. B. Price, Tfee Marshall Plan, .audits, Ifoaninft (Ithica: Cornell
university Press, 1955), p. 224.
12





6To say that the proposed military assistance bill set little
opposition during the Congressional hearings would be a gross -.mderstatcment.
It was the subject of many doubts and criticisms before final passage—tea
Liics after deliberations began and less than one month after the first
explosion of an atomic weapon by the Soviet Union.^ Of course it is only
a matter of speculation, but there are taany who insist that the Soviet
explosion insured enactment of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act (HEAP) of
1949. 15
The Mutual Defense Assostance Act, which served as the basic
authority under which the ates provided military assistance to other
nations, embodied three forms of military assistance which remain today the
heart of our military aid programs. They are: (1) machinery and materials
necessary for Europe to increase its own production of military items without
seriously interfering with economic recovery; (2) the direct transfer of
military equipment; and (3) U. S. help in the production and use of military
equipment and the training of personnel. ®
During the remainder of 1949 and 1950, the concentration on defense
objectives as opposed to those of economic assistance intensified the need
» ii I i n ii i ii i i n I n . m i i n « .11 i . i n . .
l^U. S. Congress, Senate, The Special Ccaaraittee to Study the Foreign
Aid Program, Military Assistance and the Security of the United States , 35th
Cong., 1st Scss., 1957, p. ii.
is
U. S. Congress, Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1
,
949 . Public Law
329, Slot Cong., 1st Sess., 194$.
^Department of the Air Force, Informal! ^ aud Cuidancc, Ililitary
Assistance Program (Washington: January, 1962), p. 4.

7for better coordination of all the assistance activities then underway.
Although several attempts were made to alleviate the problem, it was not
until the enactment of The Mutual Security Act of 1951, that the responsibility
for directing, supervising and coordinating the programs of military,
economic and technical assistance were vested in a single person—the Director
for Mutual Security who was designated to act on behalf of the President.
The adoption of this act marked the high point of centralised direction and
coordination of our foreign assistance programs. However, difficulties
arose in implementation since the act provided for a division of operations
among the Department of Defense for military assistance, a Mutual Security
Agency for economic assistance, and a Technical Cooperation within the
Department of State for technical cooperation.
As a result of this difficulty, a Foreign Operations Administration
(FGA) was created by Congress on August 1, 1953, and on the same day, the
President delegated most of his power under the Mutual Security legislation
to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration. Congress,
however, soon became critical of the FQA and insisted that permanent
agencies of government take over the administration of military and economic
assistance programs. Thus the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended,
provided for the termination of the Foreign Operations Administration prior
i mmmmi^mt mm^mmmm „ „ , , ,
,
,
, i , i ,
17U. S. Congress, Mutual Security Act of 1951 . Public Law 165, 82nd
Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.
1%. S., President, 1953-61 (Eisenhower), Executive Order ifo. 10476 ,
1 August 1953.

to June 30, 1955, i9 By a series of Executive Orders, 20 the President
abolished the FGA and transferred its functions to the Department of State
and the Department of Defense, The Secretary of State established the
International Cooperation Administration (ICA) within his department to
assume the J?0A functions applicable to the Department of State ; and the
Secretary of Defease assigned all responsibility for military assistance to
the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (ASD/I3A)
under the policy directiou o* 3ccBcf.
21
With the enactment of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, the Mutual
Security Program remained essentially the same until the advent of the
tfWm> Frontier1 ' in 1961, when President Kennedy advanced a new approach with
new concepts,
A flew Approach with Ifew Concepts
With the election of Senator Jfohn F. Kennedy to the presidency of the
United States also came an urgent belief that the foreign aid programs of our
country were missing the mark. As early as 1953, then Senator Kennedy and
seven of his colleagues expressed deep concern over the Mutual Security
«wh—wn— m <! i h m h > !! w.»mw.iWMn i i»»i«« nww w iwww»> •mmmm<*mmrm+m*mm—mi i \f i immmum*mm wmmmpiwwwww—»— i m i i m
J. S. Congress, Mutual Security Act of 1^54 . Public Law 665,
33rd Cong., 1st Sees., 1954.
2%. S., President, TJ53-61 (Eisenhower), Executive Orders 105"/..,
Nov. 6, 1954; Ifo. 10610, May 9, 1255; and Mo. 10623, August 2, 1555.
21Department of Defense, DOD Directive 5132.3, PCD Policy
/denization, and; Rsspftpsib^lifieft, ifelat.infi to t;.o +Ulitary, As^is^ancc
?rogrg:t (Washington: July 22, W37} > p. 2.

Appropriations Bill for 1959, in their letter of August 25, 1953, address
to the President.'- Thxi Senators indicn members of the Committee
on Foreign Relations they had voted in favor of the bill; however
... as individual members of the Senate with some experience
and understanding of the program and a full appreciation of
its importance, that with respect to the less developed countr.'.
there is a serious distortion in the present relative importance
which is attached to military and related aid on the one hand
and technical assistance and self-liquidating economic
development assistance on the other.
In further reference to military vs. economic assistance, the Senators urged
that the President
. . .
study the Mutual Security Program in the light of the
views of members of your Administration, of members of
Congress and many others who have stressed that it is la the
political and economic realm that the concepts of freedom are
now undergoing a universal trial. It may be that such a study
will lead you, Mr. President, as it has led uO to the
conclusion that the principal and most costly shortcoming in the
Mutual Security Program remains as it has been for some time—
the failure to eophasisie military aid less and to stress
economic aid and technical assistance more.
In response to the Senators 1 suggestion, President Eisenhower, on
November 24, 1958, appointed a oossaittes^S to study the military aspects of
mutual security in light of the criticisms that had been received. This




»i « i n. in ii ii in h i.. ii ii I h i , i i m il hi . i » i h »i iii»« ih i n i < .h i i
^%his letter to President Eisenhower was signed by the following
Senators in addition to Senator g&ftttfliy : T« B. Green, J. VI. Fuibright, J. J.
Sparlaaaa, Ii, H. Humphrey, Hihc liaasfield, Wayne Horse, and ;villism Laager.
2%his committee, the President's Cwaaittee to Study the United States




The Committee believes that the impression held in so;
quarters to the effect that our Military Assistance Program
is too great in relation to the economic development
assistance program is not justified. Fro© the standpoint of
United States interests, we do not sec any competitive
relationship between the tW>***
Apparently the results of this study did not satisfy Senator Kennedy,
since one of his first acts after "Election Day i; was to institute a
thoroughgoing review of foreign aid, including military assistance. The
result of this review, first outlined in President Kennedy's message of
j g
March 22, 1961 to Congress," was a new concept of foreign aid—a concept
directed toward laajor changes in the economic aid programs with military
assistance to be continued, subject to further analysis and study.
In his message, the President said that the fundamental task of the
foreign aid program for the nineteen sixties was uaot negatively to fight
communism'' but to arrange a partnership between the northern and southern
hemispheres in a demonstration that "economic growth and political democracy
can develop hand in hand.'' The President continued:
If our foreign aid funds are to he prudently and effectively
used, we need a whole new set of basic concepts and principles:
1. Unified administration and operation—a single agency in
Washington and the field, equipped with a flexible set of tools,
in place of several competing and confusing aid units.
2. Country plans—a carefully thought through program
tailored to meet the need^ and the resource potential of each
individual country, instead of a series of individual, unrelated
projects. Frequently, in the past, our development goals and
projects have not been undertaken as integral steps in a long-
range economic developmca- am.
William H. Draper, Jr. et al . , Composite Report of the Presided 'j
Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance ?ror;rap (Washington;
U. S. Government Printing Office, August 17, 1959, I, p. 156.
25U. 3., President, 1961— (Kennedy) , Foroisn Aid , Washington, D. C.
,
Mar. 22, 1961, House Document Ife. 117, 37th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961.

3. Long-term planning and financing—the only way to crake
meaningful and economical commitments.
4. Special emphasis on development loans repayable in dollars—
more conducive to businesslike relations and mutual respect than
sustaining grants or loans repaid in local currencies, although
some instances of the latter are unavoidable.
5. Special attention to those nations most willing and able
to mobilize their own resources, make necessary social and
economic reforms, engage in long-range planning, and make the
other efforts necessary if these are to reach the stage of
self-sustaining growth.
6. Multilateral approach—a program and level of commitments
designed to encourage and complement an increased effort by other
industrialised nations,
7. A new agency with new personnel—drawing upon the most
coimpetcnt and dedicated career servants nov: in the field, and
attracting the highest quality from every part of the Nation.
Separation from military assistance—our program of aid
to social and economic development must be seen on its own merits,
and judged in the light of its vital and distinctive contribution
to our basic security needs. 20
President Kennedy based his proposed International Development Program on
these premises:
1. By providing long-term support for development plans created by
the less developed nations themselves, the Jnited States can, during the decade
of the sixties, help decisively a large number of these nations along the road
to economic growth.
2. Continued progress in any less developed country will not be
assured until that country accepts and fulfills its own responsibilities to
help itself.
- . Any development assistance program of the sixties must take into
account all of the factors that contribute to growth—capital, technical







institutions, skilled labor forces, managerial skills, and the creation of
the necessary rootives and interests.
4. Each nation must be permitted to develop in its own imago.
5. Systematic research can develop new skills in development
assistance.
6. Development assistance will come to be recognised during the
sixties as a collective responsibility of all free industrialised nation
7. Foreign aid to the less developed countries should not be
endless. 2'
With respect to military assistance, the President stated in his
letter of Hay 26, 1961 to Gongres
It is essential that this program be maintained and
continued in the present international climate. Appropria-
tions will be sought to provide for the United States' share
of maintaining forces that already exist, to complete
undertakings initiated in earlier years, to give increas
emphasis to internal security, and to provide for a limited
and selected modernisation of forces in areas m.
particular duress. I envisage a continuous review and
assessment of the neede Ilitary assistance around the
world and continuing discussions with our allies and associated
nations to determine the extent to which expenditures for
defense can safely be lessened.^
Both Secretary of State fetffe and Secretary of Defense HcHamara
endorsed the President's new approach to foreign aid during hearings before
the various Congressional committees,^ Secretary Busk amplified the Chief
i n w i miii—»mwm^*m*mmmmm*ww. » mi n iip—»»^i—
—
ii» m m i—wwwww——»i n i u wmmmmm*m—m***mmm—^i*mmi—w—«mwwi n » m . m il i 11 ^-ww n h i I
'Henry R. Labouisse et al. , An Acf; for International Development: A
Suqmary Presentation (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, June,
1961), p. v.
"This letter accompanied President Kennedy's bill calling for t.
first complete revision of Mutual Security legislation since 1954.




Executive's message of 22 March, in the area of international development,
while Secretary McBamara discussed the details of the proposed military
assistance program for 1962.
The Secretary of Defense, froja the outset* made it clear during the
hearings that although his remarks were confined to military assistance, he
fully supported the economic aid progr«a as well:
The two programs are in fact indispensable to each
other; they are not competitive but complementary.
Also, according to Mr. McIIamara, our projected military assistance programs
are a necessary and integral part of this nation's overall defense effort.
Gaid he,
Through the assistance planned we anticipate an
improvement in our ability to deal with aggression in its
incipient phases, to furnish help for friends and allies
which will be more consistent with the kind of threat they face,
and to maintain the facilities abroad upon which the quick and
effective deployment of appropriate U". 3. forces depend.
Mr. McHamara indicated that the "new approach'' to military assistance
would provide: (a) a greater emphasis on the internal security needs of each
individual country, (b) a continuation of the trend to increase the
proportions and absolute amounts devoted to the Far East (See Figure 1) , and
(c) a reduction in assistance for European countries since many of these
countries are now in a position to finance their own military requirements.
It was the Secretary of Defense's belief that such a program would provide
the United States with additional flexibility, rapidity of response, and
applicability to a large variety of situations. However, he cautioned that
the proposal was not a cure-all for the complex* manifold threat the for^
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^Department of Defense, Military Assistance Facts (Washington:




of freedom confront around the world—-surprises are frequent; the future
unpredictable. 30
Considered of interest is the concluding cocsneat of a Hew York Tiswg
review of the ?'new approach' to the problem of foreign aid:
The people of the U. i. and the free world need to realise
that they are at an important juncture in world economic
history when right decisions right across the board must be made.
Basically our need is to face up realistically to our danger,
and to replace our term insurance with an endoiaaent policy. 3*
An Act for International Development y Peace and Security
Following a critical, comprehensive review and evaluation by the
Congress, the new foreign aid bill was passed and became the Forei^
Assistance Act of 1961, when signed by the President on September 4, 1961. 32
It is significant to note that this act, which was designed to give n
vigor, purpose and direction to our foreign aid programs, draws a much
sharper line between economic and military assistance than had been attempted
previously. Actually, this new legislation consists of two separate and
distinct acts: Part I, the Act for International Development of 1961, which
deals with economic assistance; and Part II, the International Peace and
Security Act of 1961, which covers the military assistance aspects of the law.
3%on, Sobert S. McHamara, Hearings on
,
3. 1,983 . op. cit ., p. 596.
31
flew York Times . March 26, 1961, Sec. IV, p. 1.
3%. s. Congress, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 . Public Law £7-193,
87th Cong., 1st Scss., 1961.

16
This separation of prograns, it was thought, would provide a convenient
neans of reviewing each program on its own merits.
Economic Assistance
The Act for International Development is of interest to a study of
military assistance for three primary reasons: (a) it provided for the
establishment of a new overall coordinating agency as a replacement for the
International Cooperation Administration, (b) ''Defense Support 11 was dropped
and included as a major part of a new category of aid called ''Supporting
Assistance" which was designed to support or promote economic or political
stability, and (c) the ''Presidents Contingency Fund," which under the
Mutual Security Act was available for both economic and military assistance,
may now be used for economic aid only.
Military Assistance
The International Peace and Security Act of 1961, as previously
indicated, is contained in Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act and provides
the current basis for military aid to the free world partners of the United
States. Although no basic change has been made in purpose or intent from that
of the Mutual Security Acts, the statement of policy has been rewritten.
In the old laws, Congress stated the intent to be that of promoting the
foreign policy, security and general welfare of the 0. S. by assisting
friendly countries and international organisations in strengthening their
individual and collective security. The new law adds to this basic statement

17
"and creating an environment of security and stability in the developing




Under the terms of the act, the President is authorised to provide
military assistance to any country (except the present Government of Cuba
and any other country dominated or controlled by the international Communist
movement) which he belie. .1 serve as a source of strength to the
security of the United States and promote world peace. (Figure 2 shows the
increase in the number of countries receiving military assistance since
1950.) Also, such assistance may be provided by leaac, exchange, or any
other means in addition to the previous provisions for loan, grant or sale.
Specifically, the new las? lists four ways in which military assistance may
be provide, by
1. Acquiring from any source and providing any defense article or
.-
2. Making financial contributions to multilateral programs for the
acquisition or construction of facilities in foreign countries for collective
defense
;
3. Providing financial assistance for expenses incident to
participation by the U. S. in regional or collective defense organisations;
and
4. Assigning ov detailing members of the Armed Forces of the United
States and other personnel of the Department of Defense to perform duties of

18
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1951 29 19 19
1952 41 23 33
1953 48 26 42
1954 51 33 44
1955 54 34 50
1956 57 39 49 3
1957 61 42 53 3
1958 64 45 56 5
1959 63 47 57 10
1960 69 52 61 11
1961 68 56 57
1962 69 57 56 13
1963 (est.) 69 58 58 13
Deoarttaent of Defense, Military Assistance Facts Olashiaftton:




a nan-combatant nature, including those relating to training or advice.
Authorination
The Jinew frontier"' administration suffered its greatest setback in
the "BSV approach" to foreign aid under Section 504 of the Act—-Authorization.
The President had requested a permanent or continuing authorisation, but
instead, Congress authorised an appropriation of not to exceed $1.7 billion
a year for two consecutive years, fiscal years 19o2 and 1963. In sub-
paragraph (b) of this section will be found the reason for Congress*
disapproval of a continuing authorisation:
In order to nake sure that a dollar spent on military
assistance to foreign countries is as necessary as a dollar
spent for the United States military establishment, the
President shall establish procedures for programing and
budgeting so that programs of military assistance come into
direct competitioxi for financial support with other activities
and programs of the Department of Defense.
On this subject of competition for funds, it is interesting to note
that contrary to Secretary McHamara's statement during the Congressional
hearings relative to the complementary nature of economic and military aid,
appropriations for military assistance are in competition with appropriations
for economic aid.**
Conditions of Eligibility
The new act not only requires that the Military Assistance Program
continue to function within the framework of executive agreements, but it
53Lecture by Tto. K. Leffingwell, Deputy Director of Military
Assistance, at the Industrial College of tba Armed Forces, 1.2 October I

prescribes specific requirements applicable to all countries receiving
defease articles on a grant basic. They must agree that:
• they will not permit such material to be used for other than the
intended purpose;
- they will protect the security of classified material;
- they will return to the United States those articles no longer
needed for the purposes for which provided; and
- they will permit U. S. officials to observe and review the use of
assistance furnished.
In addition to these prerequisites, the new act states that no
defense articles shall be furnished on a grant basis to any country at a
cost in excess of $3 million in any fiscal year unless the President
determines that the country conforms to the United Nations charter; that it
is making a reasonable effort on its own behalf; and that its increased
ability to defend itself is important to the security of the United States.
Special Authority
Probably only because of the man 'licKamara' 1 did Congress grant
approval of the administration's request to use up stocks of the Department
of Defense in providing military assistance subject to reimbursement from
sequent appropriations. Section 510 provides this authority up to an
amount aot to exceed $300 million. (The President had asked for a
limitation of $400 million.) Congress initially regarded this special
request merely aw a subt i to spend money in addition to that
appropriated. This authori:: granted only after secretary McHamara gave

the most solemn assurances that this provision would be used with the
greatest care and only in those cases where the President determines such
action uvital !l to the national security. In justification, Mr. HcNaxaara
said:
looked at the experience of this year, the prospect of
further crises in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, and the
experience of such past semi-crises years as 1938 (when roughly
$300 million was diverted to key countries as a result of the
Middle East and Offshore Islands crises), and concluded tliat
the roost desirable way to handle this kind of situation was to
ask for this type of authority, 3^
General
In addition to the two xoajor parts of the Foreign Assistance Act,
i.e., Part I concerning economic aid and Part II providing for military
assistance, the act also contains a Part III consisting of a variety of
general, administrative and miscellaneous provisions relative to the foreign
assistance program in general; and Part IV vrhich amends related laws to
bring them into line with current policy. However, due to the limited scope
of this paper, these particular parts will be discussed only to the extent
that they are pertinent to the Military Assistance Program. **
^Hon. Eoberfc S. HeNsmara, Bearinfts on H. R. 9033 . op. cit . , p. 1 •
.
^^Por a detailed listing of those provisions of the Mutual Security
Act omitted from the Foreign Assistance Bill and the reasons therefor,
reference is made to Provisions of the Mutual security Act of, .1*254, as
Amended, Qoitted from the Fs-rei,-.~a Assistance Bill and Heasons Therefor ,





Since their inception, the foreign assistance programs of the United
States have presented extremely difficult and complex problems of
organization and administration. Because of the speed with which they were
established, their supposedly temporary nature, and the magnitude of
operations involved, they have inevitably required innovations that have
given rise to serious deficiencies in planning and execution. Adding to the
complexities of administration is the fact that foreign aid is accomplished
through a number of national as well as international organizationally
Iindependent entities cutting across many agency lines in the process.
President Kennedy, In his March 22, 1961 message to Congress,
described the then existing organization as:
. . . Bureaucratically fragmented, awkward and slow, Its
administration Is diffused over a haphazard and irrational
structure covering at least four departments and several other
agencies. The program is based on a series of legislative
measures and administrative procedures conceived at different
William H. Draper, Jr. et al . . Composite Report of the President's
Committee to Study the united States Military Assistance Program




times and for different purposes, many of them now obsolete,
inconsistent, and unduly rigid and thus unsuited for our
present needs and purposes.*
As a major step toward solving the problems of organisation and
administration, the Chief Executive in his message to Congress on May 26,
1961, requested legislation which would authorise the creation of a new
agency to replace the semiautonomous International Cooperation Administration
(ICA) established by President Eisenhower in April of 1955. This new agency
would be known as the Agency for International Development (AID) ; organized
along regional lines and come under the direction of an administrator who
would have the rank of an under secretary and report directly to the
Secretary of State and to the President.
As to management of the Military Assistance Program, the President
indicated that the principal assignments of authority a3 recommended by the
Draper Committee and implemented by President Eisenhower were satisfactory
and should not be changed. The President further said:
The Department of Defense has operational responsibility
for approved programs. In recognition of the fact that
military assistance should clearly serve the foreign policy
objectives and commitments of the United States, the Secretary
of State provides continuous supervision and general direction
of the program, including the determination as to whether
there should be a program for a country and the value of that
program.
*
20. S. , President, 1961 (Kennedy), Foreign Aid . Washington, D. C.
,
Mar. 22, 1961, Bouse Document Kb. 117, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, p. 2.
U. S. , President, 1961 (Kennedy), Executive Communication ,
Washington, D. C. , May 26, 1961, Coismittee on Foreign Affairs Print, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess., 1961, p. 4.
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The Congress "bought" the President's proposed assignments which are
contained in the new law—The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961—the basic
authority for the organizational arrangements and discussions reflected in
this chapter.
Headquarters of Government
As Figure 3 indicates, management of the Military Assistance Program
involves various offices and agencies both within and without the Department
of Defense. Although primary responsibility for the management of military
assistance is vested in the Secretary of Defense, it is important to consider
those agencies external to DOD which play a significant part in the overall
planning and operation of the program.
All authority for administration of the Military Assistance Program
stems from the President of the United States. His principal non-military
advisors with respect to military assistance are the National Security
Council (NSC) for security policy, and the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) for
budgetary policy.
National Security Council (NSC)
The NSC, assisted by a board of specialists from participating
government agencies, advises the President with respect to the Integration of
domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security.
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aDepartment of the Air Force, Information and Guidance ,
Military Assistance Program (Washington: January, 1962), p. 8.
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interest in the field of military assistance.
Bureau of the Budget
The Bureau of the Budget, as the fiscal ana of the President, plays
a key role in the coordination of foreign aid operations. It is the
director of this bureau who insures that proposed expenditures and authoriza-
tions for military assistance are compatible with the policy of the President.
The Bureau of the Budget also serves to resolve interagency disagreements
concerning fiscal elements or questions that may develop in the area of
foreign aid.
Secretary of State
Since the principal objective of military assistance is to promote
the foreign policy of the United States, the overall cordination and general
direction of MAP is vested in the Secretary of State. In accordance with the
authorising legislation, the Secretary of State is responsible for
determining whether or not a country is to receive military aid and to what
extent. 5 Military aid cannot begin in a country until the Department of
State first agrees with the recipient country on the relations between the
United States and the country for the period the program is to be in force.
'Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government,
Overseas Economic Operations , A Report Prepared by the Task Force on Overseas
Economic Operations, June, 1955, p. 104.
^Section 622(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
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The strengthening of the position of the State Department on the
policy level of military assistance planning and an increased assurance of
the conformity of the Military Assistance Program to foreign policy was a
principal recocaaendation of the Draper Committee. Hie committee stated
that
The central role in a system of meaningful and
effective foreign policy guidance of military assistance,
utilised on behalf of the President and the Secretary of
State, must be that of the State Department. &
Although previous legislation authorised the Secretary of State the
power of veto over military assistance programs, interpretations by the
various agencies were not in agreement and as a result effective coordination
was not realised. It is the apparent intention of the Kennedy administration,
armed with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1%1, to insure State Department
supremacy in all matters of foreign aid.
Secretary of Treasury
The Military Assistance Prograci is also influenced by the Treasury
Department. This department provides guidance of the program in the areas
of monetary and fiscal policy. Of particular concern to the Treasury
Department are those transactions which affect the tfoited States balance of
payments and those transactions which involve the use of foreign currency.
^Composite Beport, op. cit ., p. 28.
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Ondar the provision of the new Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the
Secretary of ftefens© has operat ional rasponaibility for approved military
assistance programs. Bic la? sets out in detail hie responsibilities under
part IX of the act. Hfoey ares
1. Determination of raiiitary e**d>ite&i r^uivements.
2. Procurement of military e^ipnant in a manner which peraita its
integration with service program*.
3. Supervision of end-item use fey recipient countries.
4. Supervision of the training of foreign military personnel.
5. Movetaaat and delivery of military end-items.
6. Establishment c£ priorities in procurement , delivery, ami
allocation of roilitary equipment.
7. Any other functions within the DafMtftmeat of Defense with respect
to tne furnishing of military assistance.
As a deans of fulfilling these responsibilities, the Secretary of
Defease- delegated moat of his military assistance functions to various
7
elements within the Oaparttaeat of Defense, The functions of each are
provided under the appropriate organisational element appearing in this
chapter.
7







As illustrated by Figure 3, an important level of foreign aid
management follows immediately below the Cabinet level in the make-up of the
Executive Branch organization to administer the various foreign assistance
programs. On this level is included the new Agency for International
Development (AID), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) , the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA), and the military
departments, i.e., Army, Navy, and Air Force.
Agency for International Development (AID)
In enacting the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Congress made
provisions for the proposal of President Kennedy that a new, single agency be
established to provide central direction and assume final responsibility for
our various foreign aid programs. Said the President:
I am not proposing merely a reshuffling and relabeling
of old agencies and their personnel, without regard to their
competence. I era recommending the replacement of these
agencies with a new one—a fresh start under new leadership.
Thus, the Agency for International Development came into being.
Based on the recommendaeions of The President's Task Force on
Foreign Economic Assistance, 9 AID became an agency within the State Department,
headed by an administrator with the status of Under Secretary of State, and
°U. S., President (Kennedy), House Doc. No. 117, op. cit ., p. 6.
%enry E. Labouisse, op. ci.fc . , p. 127.
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reporting directly to the Secretary of State and the President. The
administrator was charged with the responsibility of formulating and
executing the Economic Assistance Program, and coordinating the Military
Assistance Program with that of economic and technical assistance.
As of this writing, 1 April 1962, a firm organization has not been
developed for the new Agency for International Development. However, it is
expected to follow the general outline of that recommended by The President's
Task Force on Foreign Economic Assistance as shown in Figure 4. Commenting
on the new agency and its first administrator, Mr. Fowler Hamilton, an
editorial in The Washington Daily Hews stated:
It will be three or four months before he (Mr. Hamilton)
completes reorganization of his agency. And he doesn't expect
anyone on the outside to see much improvement in his operations
before next fall.
If this seems like a slow start, for the 14-month-old
Kennedy Administration, it must be remembered Mr. Hamilton has
been on the job only four months.^
Although great things are expected of the Agency for International
Development, it is estimated that at least one and maybe two or three years
will be required before Congress can be sure the program is going the way
promised.
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International
Security Affairs) (ASD/ISA)
Subject to the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of
Defense, all military assistance policy and operational responsibilities have
10Peter Edson, "Big Selling Job Ahead," The Washington Daily Hews ,
March 12, 1962.
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been delegated to the Assistant Secretary of Defease for International
Security Affairs. More specifically, and in addition to his other functions,
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) is charged v?ith the responsibility
for the development, direction, supervision, and coordination of the
Military Assistance Program; also, planning, organising and monitoring the
activities of the Military Assistance Advisory Groups. 2
The ASD/ISA accomplishes his delegated responsibilities through the
Office of the Director of Military Assistance. An organisation chart of the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
is included as Figure 5.
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
The Joint Chiefs of Staff play a very significant role in assuring
that military assistance programs are in consonance with global security
plans, and that military assistance resources are being distributed most
effectively to further U. S. strategic concepts. Their reconraendations with
respect to military assistance take the form of Annex "J" to the Joint
Strategic Objectives Plan. Included are recanKaendat ions relative to military
objectives, force objectives, scale of equipping, and priorities, on a
country and area ba3is. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are charged
with providing the Secretary of Defense with advice on all military assistance
affairs, plans, and programs that have strategic or military operational
1-3
implications. *
" ii • mm m i mum n » ' i i .i n I I i ii n
i2DOD Directive 5132.3, op. cit . , p. 3.
13Ibid
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Basically, the military departments serve as supply and logistic
agents for the Military Assistance Program. In accomplishing their mission
they
(a) Prepare data necessary for the development of programs and budget
estimates.
(b) Provide technical advice on weapons systems to the ASD(ISA)
,
Unified Commanders, and the MAAG's.
(c) Procure and deliver to recipients, material and services included
in approved programs in accordance with delivery schedules approved by the
ASD(ISA)
.
(d) Develop and conduct training programs for foreign nationals.
(e) Provide administrative support to Unified Commands and MAAG's,
subject to the direction and policy guidance of the Director of Military
Assistance.
The military departments are also responsible for operating the
military sales program in accordance with the directives of the ASD(ISA) , and
in coordination with the Department of State.^
Although each of the three military departments has its own
organisation for the accomplishment of the above assignments, the differences
are not considered of sufficient magnitude to warrant discussion within the
15limited scope of this paper.
14Ibid . , pp. 4-5.
^^For a discussion of organizational differences, see Robert E. Benson,
"Analysis of Administration of the United States Military Assistance Program"
(unpublished Master's Thesis, School of Government, Business and International
Affairs, The George Washington University, June 7, 1961), pp. 36-42.
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Operating or Field Level
The organizational arrangements and responsibilities for military
assistance discussed up to this point have been those centered in Washington,
D. C. , or at the headquarters level. This section provides an insight into
the organization for administration, planning and programming of military
assistance on the intermediate and field levels.
The Unified Coianands
With respect to military assistance, the three Unified Commands and
the geographical areas for which they are responsible are: CINCARIB, whose
responsibility comprises all of Latin America; CINCEUR territory includes all
of Europe, North Africa (The Army is responsible for HAP in tropical Africa)
,
the Hear East and South Asia; and CINCPAC's area of responsibility takes in
all of the Far East and Southeast Asia.
Generally speaking, the Unified Commands provide an intermediate level
of policy guidance and review between Washington and the Military Assistance
Advisory Groups in each country receiving military assistance. They direct
and supervise: (a) the activities of the MAAC's in their respective areas,
(b) the execution of approved programs, and (c) the development of recomuended
plans and programs correlating them with U. S. military plans in their area.
Although segments of the Unified Commands may communicate with their
respective military departments, the line of command is directly between those
commands and the Secretary of Defense (See Figure 6). The Assistant Secretary












































to communicate directly with the Unified Coajaands, coordinating with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff on strategic or military operational matters. Conversely, the
JC3 are required to coordinate all directives and communications which pertain
to military assistance with ASD/ISA.
The Country Team
Although "The Country Team" as such is not defined in any official
dogma, it has by custom and usage become a real and significant cog in the
organisational machinery for military assistance. This so-called team Is
chaired by the U. S. Ambassador in the Country, and has as members the Chief,
Military Assistance Advisory Group; the Director of the Operations Mission
(USOM: the AID field agency within the country); and the Embassy's political
counsellor (USIA).
The U. S. Ambassador, as representative of the President and acting
on his behalf, has the responsibility for coordinating both economic and
military assistance with the foreign policy of our government. President
Kennedy, in a letter to all Chiefs of Missions emphasised this responsibility
when he said:
In regard to your personal authority and responsibility,
I shall count on you to oversee and coordinate all the
activities of the U. 3. Government in (the country to which
assigned)
.
You are in charge of the entire United States Diplomatic
Mission, and I shall expect you to supervise all of its
operations. The Mission includes not only the personnel of
the Department of State and the Foreign Service, but also the
representatives of all other United States agencies which have
programs or activities in (the country to which assigned). 1 ?
16DOD Directive 5132.3, op. cit ., pp. 6-8.
^Quoted from unpublished lecture by Vfra. M. Leffingwell, Deputy Director
of Military Assistance, at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces,
12 October 1961, p. 15.
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"The Country Tecm, n then serves as the tool by which and through which
the Ambassador exercises his coordination responsibilities of the country
level. Broad guidance for the development of military assistance and
supporting assistance program is provided 'the Country Team" in the form of
a Joint Planning Document issued by the Departments of State and Defense.
^
Direct lines of command to the various team components are: Secretary
of State to the Ambassador to USIA; AID to 03CM; and the Unified Commands to
the HMG's.
Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's)
The Military Assistance Advisory Groups are representatives of the
Secretary of Defense in the country to which accredited, and as such are the
"front-line 51 troops in the administration and operation of the Military
Assistance Program. A3 previously indicated, they serve two masters—they are
under the supervision of the Ambassador and under the direct command of the
Unified Commands which supervise and direct their activities.
It is the personnel of the MAAG's who are in direct contact with the
military in the recipient country. They provide advisory services and
technical assistance to their counterparts in the country to which assigned.
This involves the unpleasant tasks of turning down unrealistic proposals
and requests or advising a sovereign nation that its methods and procedures
are antiquated. Actually, the effectiveness of military assistance
ultimately depends on the officers and men assigned to the MAAG's. It is at
the MAAG that the General Accounting Office points its accusing finger if
mr iij wi i i i . r m i „ i ii i- 1 m i win .uiL. j -hi i . iih ii l i in in n . i i nymi ri t i nt i i r— ~ '— ' ' ' " -,—...,. ... .,, i. , ..,-,— , -———,- — - —
18Ibid., p. 16.

waste and inefficiency exist in the Military Assistance Program within a
country.^
The MAAG's are also responsible for: (a) aaking recommendations to
the Unified Commands concerning military assistance in their respective
countries; (b) developing military assistance plans and programs, in
cooperation with the Ambassador, and submitting them to the Unified Commands;
(c) making observations and reporting on the utilisation of material furnished
and personnel trained by the Military Assistance Program; arranging for the
receipt and transfer of military assistance material; and administering
20
military sales transactions.
19 Ibid. . p. 23.
20DOD Directive 5132.3, op. cit ., pp. 8-9.

CHAPTER III
MAJOR COMPONENTS OF THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
Introduct ion
Although frequent reference has been made to £he. Military Assistance
Program, military assistance per s.e is accomplished through functional
components of MAP, each of which is known as a functional program. Within
each functional program a variety of forms of assistance is made available to
countries of the Free World as a means of complementing their individual
resources. Forms of assistance range from administrative or organisational
type assistance to almost complete grant aid support. Each of the functional
programs, whether they cover equipment, supplies, construction, training, etc.,
encompasses a different type of assistance and is developed and administered
under different criteria and procedures. It is the purpose of this chapter
to identify and discuss, in general terms, the objectives of each of the
functional or component programs of the Military Assistance Program.
lSince the overall objectives of the various functional programs are
essentially the same within each service, and in consideration of the limited
scope of this paper; any discussion of program details will be confined to
the modus operandi of one service—The U. S. Navy. For a discussion of the
programs as administered by the Army and Air Force see Department of the Air






The Grant Aid Material Program
Under the Grant Aid Material Program, equipment, materials and
supplies nay be provided certain Free World nations on a non-reiabursement
basis, i.e., repayment is not generally expected. As in the case of previous
military assistance legislation, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, authorises
the furnishing of equipment and material to any nation whose increased
ability to defend itself is considered, by the President, to be important to
the security of the United States; provided such nation is otherwise eligible
to receive foreign aid. Material grants are made available to a country for
the purposes of (a) maintaining their internal security and self-defense,
(b) assisting in the defense of its area, and/or (c) participating in collective
security arrangements consistent with the charter of the United Nations.
Before any grant aid material can be given to a country, the United
States and the prospective recipient must reach an agreement on relat-
between the two countries for the duration of the program. These agreements,
which began with aid to Greece and Turkey in 1947, and called "Agreement on
Aid," arc executive in nature rather than treaties; therefore, Congressional
approval is not required.
Agreements are generally bilateral and cover a wide range of subjects;
however, they do serve as the framework for the Grant Aid Material Program
within the limits of foreign aid legislation.
-
"' Grant Aid recipients must,
2U. S. Congress, House, U. S. Foreign Aid , Document Ho. 116, pp. cic .
p. 7.
*%. S. Congress, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 . op. cit .

in addition to accepting the conditions the President considers essential in
safeguarding the interests of the United States, give assurances that they
villi
Join in promoting international understanding and good
will and maintaining world peace.
Take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate
causes of international tension.
Fulfill the military obligations assiuned under bilateral or
multilateral agreements or treaties to which the United States
is a party.
Make, consistent with their political and economic stability,
the full contribution permitted hy their manpower, resources,
facilities and general economic conditions to the development and
maintenance of their own defensive strength and the defensive
strength of the Free Ifcrld.
Take all reasonable measures needed to develop their defense
capacities.
Take appropriate steps to insure the effective utilisation
of the assistance furnished in furtherance of the policies and
purposes of the authorising Act.
Maintain the security of any article, service or Information
furnished.
Impose appropriate restrictions against transfer of title to,
or possession of, any equipment, information or services furnished,
without the prior consent of the President.
Furnish equipment and materials, services or other assistance
consistent with the Charter of the United ISations, to the United
States, or to and among other nations to further the policies and
purposes of the authorising Act.
Permit continuous observation and review by United States
representatives of programs of assistance, including the
utilisation of any such assistance and provide the United States
with full and complete information with respec:; to these matters,
as the President may require.
For illustrative purposes, a copy of the "Agreement of Cooperation
Between the United States and Turkey" is included as Appendix II.
The Training Program
Because of the commodity with which it deals, the Military Assistance
Training Program is perhaps the most unique of all the functional programs.





This training, carried out both in the United States and in the recipient
countries, is a significant and vital method of providing military assistance
to most of the less developed countries. According to the Draper Committee,
the training of foreign nationals produces more useful returns for the dollars
expended than any other single aspect of the Military Assistance Program."
The objectives of foreign training are to:
Attain maximum effectiveness of the foreign military forces at the
earliest possible time.
Achieve proper operation and maintenance of MAP supplied equipment
and proper utilization of other supplies provided under the program.
Establish self-sufficient training programs in the recipient countries.
Facilitate the transition to more modern equipment.
Assist in the accomplishment of responsibilities for the maintenance
of overseas internal security.
Create friendship and good will for the United States.
With respect to the last item listed, but by far not the least in
importance, more and more emphasis has been placed on foreign training as a
means of furthering President Eisenhower's :'People to People Program.
"
Admiral Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations, in welcoming senior foreign
officers to The Supply Management Course conducted annually by the Bureau of
Supplies and Accounts said:
I I I I II .1. . M il II I I ! . I. I II ' II »
^Composite Report, op. pit ., p. 163.
department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
OPNAV INSTRUCTION 4950. IB, Directive for Foreign Military Training
(Washington: 15 July 1958), p. 1.
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We welcome this opportunity for you to observe not only
our Navy but our citizens as they go about the business of their
daily lives. It is our hope that you will meet taany of our
people and that lasting friendships will be developed. Such
friendships between the peoples of the free wrld form an
important bond and develop a better mutual understanding of liberty,
freedom and the dignity of mankind*?
Also, CNO in his Directive for Foreign Military Training, provides for
and encourages extracurricular activities in connection with the training of
foreign nationals. This directive emphasizes the opportunity for foreign
naval trainees in the Waited States to see and become familiar with the United
States, its people, its way of life and its potential for supporting its
international commitments . Provisions are also included for the payment of
transportation (up to 200 wiles) in connection with extracurricular activities,
and a payment of $9.00 per officer to the host activity for entertainment
purpose
Appendix III is a typical travel itinerary for the annual Supply
Management Course for Senior Foreign Officers.
The types of foreign training provided are varied—each designed to
meet a specific objective or need. Training programs normally fall into one
of the following categories:
Formal training which is usually scheduled to be conducted at a
regular naval training facility, or at Navy schools already in operation in
the United States. This type training may, however, be conducted at
^Quoted from unpublished speech delivered by Admiral Anderson, USN,
to participants in the 1961 Naval Supply lianagement Course for Senior Foreign
Officers on 18 September 1961, Washington, D. C.
department of the Navy, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 4950. IB, op. cit ., p. 9.
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facilities in the United States or overseas, ashore and afloat, which are
not necessarily training activities per se .
Orientation visits provide for orientation and indoctrinatioaal type
training for key foreign military and civilian pet-soxmel in appropriate fields
of military, administrative or technical interest.
On-the-job training includes the attendance of selected foreign
trainees at particular naval activities for the purpose of obtaining
instruction through observation and practical procedures.
Mobile training teams are composed of U. 3. military and/or civilian
personnel who provide instruction in the recipient country. They are
generally used to train initial "Instructors'* cadres and not to meet a
continuing requirement.
Technical representatives are civilian personnel supplied by U. S.
industrial or government organisations to perform a more specialized mission
than that which is normally assigned to a mobile training team.
Operational training involves indoctrination cruises or visits to
U. S. vessels or at operational military units for the purpose of
demonstrating modern military procedures to foreign military personnel.
Ships transfer training includes all training conducted to prepare
a foreign crew to take over a vessel which has haexi authorized for transfer
to its government.
Other training support includes such miscellaneous training as
observer training, ship overhaul training, mission training, etc.
i > n i i H i i i ii ii r »'i » u '! i i n i
9
Ibid . » p. 7.
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Foreign trainees coming to the United States are issued Invitational
Travel Orders (ITQ) and an Identification Card which under ordinary
circumstances authorises them to participate in all service activities of the
regular U. S. Forces including medical care within limits. In addition,
ITO's issued under the provisions of Grant Aid authorize the payment of per
diem allowances comparable with those paid U. S. Navy officers while serving
on temporary duty assignments. "
To appreciate the magnitude of MAP Grant Aid dollars allocated to
the training of foreign nationals, a breakdown of expenditures by fiscal
years is provided in Figure 7.
The Military Sfiles Program
The Military Sales Program is more of the ideal form of military
assistance from the taxpayers' standpoint, and certainly in line with
President Kennedy's '' 'new working concept" of foreign aid. In support of
foreign assistance before the Congress, the Chief Executive said:
It is essential that the developing nations set for
themselves sensible targets; that these targets be based on
balanced programs for their own economic, educational, and
social growth—programs which use their own resources to the
maximum.
This program enables those countries which are able to assume a greater share
of their defense activities to procure defense articles and services from the
United States on a reimbursable basis. It provides a means of supplementing
'«' wwiwxwwtw—
w
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Ibid. . pp. 27-28.
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Fiscal Year Millions of Fiscal Year Millions of
Dollars Dollars
1951 $22.6 1953 $58.8
1952 73.3 1959 82.6
1953 37.5 1960 n/a
1954 52.4 1961 92.0
1955 72.9 1962 125.4
1956 44.4 1963 139.2 (est.)
1957 49.7
dollar totals are for formal course training in the United States and




grant military assistance. Figure reflects the extent to which this has
been done by the NATO countries during the years 1950 through 1961.
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 provides the general authority for
military sales, but as in the case of grant aid, specific authority for
individual countries to purchase through Mutual Security Military Sales
(MSMS) procedures is to be found in the bilateral agreements between the
United States and the specific countries. Although the bilateral agreements
do not specify which of three types of MSMS are authorized, they are so
worded as to permit negotiations between foreign government military attaches
or other representatives of their embassy in Washington, D. C. , and the
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, The four types of military sales
are: (a) Cash with Order, (b) 120-Day Credit, (c) Dependable Undertaking,
and (d) Extended Periods of Credit. 12
Cash with Order
Under this type of MSMS an order for equipment, material or services
is accompanied by a check to cover all costs involved including packing,
crating and handling or transportation costs. This type of transaction has
the advantage of permitting procurement, if the material required is not
available in U. 5. Navy stocks, without further recourse to the foreign
country, i.e., unless the new procurement price exceeds the amount deposited.
If new prices exceed the amount deposited, supply action is held in abeyance
until additional funds are deposited.
» ! » UN
^Department of the Navy, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, BUSANDAINST
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Foreign governments may also utilise a "Blanket Deposit System" for
use in the purchase of spare parts, Under this arrangement deposits are
generally made to cover one year*s requirements, and orders are written
against this deposit. Accounting statements are then furnished the recipient
country upon completion of supply action or at the end of the year for which
the deposit was made.
120-Day Credit
Certain foreign countries are authorized to procure U. S. Navy stock
items on credit. Under this arrangement, credit is extended up to 120 days
after shipment of the material, with payment due x*ithin 90 days from receipt
of the accounting statement. The advantages accruing to a country through
use of this type MSM3 are:
(a) Orders may be placed without an Initial outlay of cash.
(b) Items in the Navy Stock Lists may be ordered under a specific
"case number" without generating correspondence for price and availability
studies.
(c) Periodic accounting statements provide full information as to
items billed, proof of shipment, accessorial charges and the destination to
which the payment should be forwarded.
Dependable Undertaking
The term "dependable undertaking" is generally applied to those sales
to foreign governments which involve long lead time procurement and a
substantial number of dollars. Sales consummated under dependable under-
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takings must be approved by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and
maintained under constant surveillance. The primary advantage of this
"contract authority" type sale is that the country concerned does not have to
put up large deposits at the tirae the order is submitted. However, payment
must be received prior to shipment of the material or equipment from the
United States.
Extended Periods of Credit
13iiales consummated under this authority may be made on any
conditions the President may approve, i.e., the credit term is unlimited.
In such cases military assistance funds are used to reimburse the supplying
service. In addition, the administrator of the Agency for International
Development (AID) may, when in his opinion the best interests of the United
States will be served, authorise a delay of payment up to three years after
delivery of the defense articles.
Of the four types of military sales under the Military Assistance
Program, the 120-Day Credit arrangement is the most efficient and least
costly method of selling stocked Items. On civilian-type equipment, the Navy
encourages allied navies to submit their orders directly to the appropriate
commercial source. This practice has almost completely eliminated the time-
consuming, small unit purchase military sales items from the Navy's purchase
14
system.
Figure 9 shows the Navy's processing cycle for military sales
involving major equipments and classified items.
M i i - ~ ' ' '
"
"
i3Section 503 of the Foreign. Assistance Act of 1961.
l
^J. B. Warner, Jr., '"The Navy Program for Military Assistance,"
Monthly Newsletter: Ma^aaine of the Haw Supply Corps . August, 1960, p. 10.
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CYCLE FOR MUTUAL SECURITY MILITARY SALES
WHERE COMPLETE EQUIPMENTS, MAJOR ITEMS AND
























































The Mutual Weapons Development Program 15
The Mutual Weapons Development Program was designed for the purpose
of increasing the defensive capability of the United States and its allies
by accelerating the research and development of advanced types of non-nuclear
weapons and equipment. Also, the program is expected to provide our allies
with items more suited to their needs and thereby more economical to operate
and maintain than corresponding items produced in the United States.
Under this program, which is jointly administered by the Director of
Research and Engineering and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International
Security Affairs)
,
participating countries finance a share of the costs while
the United States provides technical advice and limited financial assistance.
In this way we gain assurances that the available technical capabilities of
the Free World nations are being brought to bear on the scientific problems
encountered in maintaining effective defenses in this technological age.
Implementation of the Mutual Weapons Development Program is
accomplished through a Mutual Weapons Development Team (MWD) assigned to the
Office of the Defense Advisor, USRO Paris, France. Based on annual surveys,
this team recommends weapon development projects to US EUCOM who, in turn,
forwards them with pertinent comments to Washington for review by the
Director of Defense Research and Engineering, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (ISA), the OASD Comptroller, the Department of State, and the Bureau
of the Budget.
15Department of the Air Force, MAP , op. cit . , p. 14.
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For those projects which are approved, the MWD Team negotiates
technical agreements with the countries concerned. These technical agreements
delineate the projects, obligate the funds, and serve as a basis for the
payment of specified funds in support of approved projects.
The Weapons Production Program
The Weapons Production Program is a natural follow-on of the Mutual
Weapons Development Program. Under this program, the United States furnishes
our allies with engineering services, samples of material, plus any
specialised test equipment and tooling that may be required. However, the
selection of projects and individual country contributions must be agreed upon
by NATO members and/or individual nations and the United States. As a
combination of the former Facilities Assistance and Sample Weapons Programs,
the Weapons Production Program is designed to assist our allies in the
manufacture of military equipment. It also serves as a means of stimulating
and facilitating more effective cooperative efforts among friendly allied
countries in the production of modern weapons, including missiles. The onus,
however, is on the participating countries—they are expected to procure the
major portion of both material and service requirements from their own
resources and with their own funds.
The NATO Infrastructure Program
In general terms, infrastructure involves the international





operations. The United States, as early as 1950, has participated in the
financing of these NATO projects which provide essential military
installations such as airfields, communication and radar facilities, POL
transmission and storage facilities, naval bases, war headquarters, and
training facilities for the use of all military forces committed to NATO.
The infrastructure projects of NATO are planned and financed under
annual programs called "slices," each identified by a number, starting with
Slice I, in calendar year 1950. Up until 1960, these projects generally
covered major installations such as naval bases and airfields. Since 1960,
the emphasis has been placed on storage for nuclear warheads, and Surface-to*
Air (SAM) and Surface-to -Surface (SA3) missile sites.
During the early '50's the United States contributed over 43% of the
NATO infrastructure costs and an average of 37% during the late '50's, with
17
estimates for fiscal years 1962 and 1963 running at slightly less than 31%




BUDGETARY PROCESS FOR K&TZN& ASSISTANCE1
As pointed out by the 1961 class, Navy Graduate Coraptrallership
Program, "there are probably as many definitions of the word * budget* as
there are people who have written about the subject."2 It was the opinion
of the class of *61» and one shared by this writer, that Mauley R. Jonas
covered the major points of most writers on the subject when he stated that:
Budgets are essentially tools for planning and ixaplamentistg
plans. . . . The operating budget is a summary of . . . future
plans, £ast interns of dollars. It provides a set of goals
. . . /and for/ a measure of how well these goals have been
achieved—how well the actual performance compares with the
standards that have been set in the budget. 3
^Unless otherwise indicated, the material for this chapter is based
on notes taken during interviews with Cormander Levis 0* Smith, U3R, Foreign
Military Assistance Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, on
February 21 and 25, 1962.
2
"Performance Budgeting and Financial Management In the Department of
the Navy," (unpublished research report of the 1961 class, Ravy Graduate
Comptrollership Program, The George Washington Ifaiversity, February 10, 1961),
p. 4.
%anley Howe Jones, E^ecu^ive peci^oft ffaj|fl,aft (Homewood, Illinois:




Whatever the definition, the budget has long hti&n the decisive
resource-allocating instrument in the federal government—it lies at the very
4heart of our national security policymaking. This fact recognised, it was
in the area of budget formulation that the Draper Committee made some of its
most profound and readily adopted recommendations for improvement of the
plannins-progrsniine-budgeting process for military assistance. In its
3 June 1959 report to the President, the committee recommended that the
Executive Branch take action to put into effect procedures for programing
military assistance, the key aspects of which were* (1) three year, time
phased programs; (2) greater decentralization of programing responsibility
to the Unified Commands; (3) establishment and annual revision on a continuing
basis of dollar guidelines for the three year programing period; (4) increased
participation la the programing process by the "Country Team" under the
direction of the Ambassador; and (5) justification of the program to the
Congress by representatives of the Department of Defense assisted by
representatives of the State Department and the then International
Cooperation Administration (functions absorbed by AID). 5
Executive Branch implementation of these recommendations (to varying
5
degrees) began in 1959, and was largely completed by mid-1960.
*U, S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations,
Organising for national Security. 87th Cong., 1st Sese., 1961, p. 1. A
study prepared for the committee by its Subcommittee on National Policy
Hachinery.
^Composite Eepert, op. cit . » p. 36.





Plan and Program Guidance Development—
Kationai and Unified Command Level
In grappling with such formidable questions as: How much of our
national substance should be devoted to the requirements of national
security? What is the right level of foreign aid? What is the best division
between military and economic aid?, etc., the President requires and seeks
help from many quarters. ? He turns to the national Security Council, the
Departments of State and Defense, the Agency for International Development,
and other agencies concerned with national security matters, for advice in
determining the order of magnitude of appropriations vhich he will seek from
Congress for military aid. Of course, this determination lias built into it
certain political realities of what the President thinks he can get and hov
much he is willing to fight for the program.
All of these considerations come together, initially, in general
terms at the National Security Council level where a specific dollar
guideline is established. This guideline then, in the case of military
assistance, li referred to the Department of Defense for translation into
dollar guidelines by geographic areas which conform to the areas of the
Unified Commands that have HAP responsibilities. These are USCINCEUB. for
the European Command (EUCCM), CIHCPAC for the Pacific Command (PACC21) , and
CIHCARIB for the Caribbean Command (CAaiBCOM), 8
These dollar guidelines are then issued to the commanders of the
Unified Commands who have the responsibility for establishing ceilings, by
'
i n m i mm m——
—
n inn i i i ii « ii, in m i < i - n » », m im i m i m i m i i i i i
fifc S. Congress, Organising for national Security. o? v cift:., p. 1.
There are other commanders of tJhified Coasaands but they are not
involved in the Military Assistance Program.
.:t
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country, within their area, la other words, the Unified Ceramander "splits up
the pot" hy dollar values and by countries as ha deems bast and further
transmits the information to the individual Military Assistance Advisory
Groups, the MAAG mist then, within the dollar ceiling imposed for a specific
country, further divide the planning "pot" among the three services. All
across the board in the "pot splitting" from Washington to the individual
MAAG' a, the split is determined by the threats and the requirements to xaeet
those threats rather than on an equitable dollar distribution by services.
An equal split could only take place in a country which had groat balance
existing within its forces in being* Such a situation would be rare indeed.
provides the Unified Cotsaanders and the H&afi's with policy, technical and
administrative guidance in the form of two important publications* Technical
and administrative guidance required for the preparation of plans and
programs is provided in the ^Wfcary A^s^ance Hafflflft (M&S). *he l^M^ry
Assistance Basic glaaairas document (BP»), the more significant of the two
publications, is a consolidation of all available policy guidance for the
preparation of military assistance plans.
l&e Basle Planning document is compiled in coordination with the
Bepartraent of State and the new Agency f<er International Development (AII» *
Within the aft* there are three sets ©f guidelines, political, military and
economic, each of which are set forth in specific terras, country by country.
Actually, the book U divided into "country chapters" which become the basic
policy considerations for the Unified Commanders and for the individual
HAAG's iM developing specific plans and programs for their countries.

00
Generally, the guidance is broad enough to give the field commanders an
opportunity to maneuver within reasonable limits in what is essentially a
fluid situation.
Figures 10 and 11, which are two of an eight part flow chart series
on HAP planning and programing, graphically illistrate the plan and program
guidance development on the National and Unified Command levels.
nm m4 ?*?mffi Pm^lmmn'-9^^n for?*
The country program is developed by the Chief MAAG in conjunction
with the so-called "Country Team." As will be remembered, the Country Team
is composed of the U. S. Ambassador in the country, who serves as chairman
of the team; the Chief, MAAG; the Mrector of the Operations Mission
(USGM); 9 and the Embassy's political counsellor. Preliminary plans and
programs for military assistance are worked over by the Country Team within
the framework of the Basic Planning Document to insure that the plan is
feasible on all three fronts, i.e., military, political and economic.
The problem of local currency, both 0. S, and indigenous controlled,
may be cited as an example of the importance of the economic review. The
AU> representative on the Country Team has to predict the amount of tax
revenues which will be generated for the year, sad provide an estimate of the
gross national product that will be achieved during the five year planning
phase. This is done in order to determine the amount of local currency
that may be available for military operations. Concurrently, he does the
sane thing for If, S, controlled local currency which is generated in several
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commodities, ° and (b) Supporting Assistance. 11
Through the sale of surplus comwsditiea a country obtains revenue in
local currency for the sale of product* that have previously been paid for by
the U. S. taxpayer in the ferns of price supports. 12 Although agreements
under the surplus commodity legislation are negotiated with countries on an
individual basis, they all specify that the local currency so generated will
be expended by the country on 0. $« approved development projects only.
A portion of this currency goes into economic programs, end another portion
is "worked into the indigenous military budget. ISuu h goes into the
military budget is generally expended on soft goods, i.e., the building of
barracks, food for the troops, military pay, shoes, clothing, etc.
Under the supporting assistance arrangement, a determination is made
by the United States as to what items and materials a country needs to assist
in its further economic development but which it is not capable of producing
on it© own. Economic foreign aid funds are then used to purchase these goods
which are imported and turned over to the country for sale on the local
market, thereby generating local currency. !£he proceeds from such sales are
deposited in a joint US-Country account iM a local bank. However, the local
i m i in I . »l i mm I ni l .iiiii n iiil n i n ii n i i ii nli HUM I i m.i im i.i - n il l m i ill i ill i n il n iiili ill i i i ii h i ii nn ii - i n i
^Authorised by Public Law 430 wherein surplus commodities may be
disposed of overseas under certain conditions.
|t
Supporting Assistance prior to the FAA of 1961, was known as
Defeaae Support—a form of economic aid administered by IC&, and carried
forward under the new legislation by its successor organisation, AID under
a new name*
*^8mm funds are administered and accounted for by the Department
of Agriculture,

government cannot withdraw funds from this account unless the withdrawal ha*
been countersigned by an appropriate United States authority. The reetrains
13
and control thus provided leads to the term "U, S. Controlled Currencies."
As can be 3een» consideration of both indigenous and U. S. controlled
currencies available in a country, is important in developing a Military
Assistance Program for that particular nation. All of these factors oust
be projected on the local scene and "cranked" into the budget for each
country eligible to receive military assistance funds. Discussions between
U. S. and country representatives incident to the development of assistance
plans, programs, and related data, however, must be conducted in such a uay
as to make it clear that they do not constitute or imply a com fitment on the
part of the United States. 1^
Figures 12 and 13 illustrate the guidance received, the development,
and the review process involved in military assistance planning and programing
on the country level.
The, Soviet; i?roccs s-Unified Comand, and $MW?- ^flY^s
When final agreement iu reached on the country level; the detailed
plan, expressed in financial terms, is forwarded back through the same
military chain through which this initial planning vao delegated, i.e., the
Unified Commanders and then on to Washington. It is the Unified Commander's
risibility to review each MkAG's sutxxUsioti in terms of its relationship
n il |i in i i.i.i....!.» ill i m .iiii. m i » I « li . I' " m i ' M M l l iliiiiiii n .il ii n
i311iis system was developed as a means of insuring that funds are
utilised for sound economic development programs so designed increase
the industrial capacity of the country or improve its overall econouy to acme
Department of Defense, Military Assistance t&nua
,
! (Washington:
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to other military-aid country objectives and programs within his regional area
for such refinement as deemed necessary. The Unified Commander then forwards
detailed item data to the Director of Military Assistance on electrical
accountins machine cards which indicate the program year for each program line
item for which a delivery/expenditure is projected during the six-year period
encompassed by the five-year planning period plus the current fiscal yer
This same review and forwarding action is accomplished by each of the three
Unified Commands concerned with the planning and programing of the Military
Assistance Progress. Flow of the plan and prograa process on the Unified
Coasaand level is illustrated by Figure 14.
In Washington, the Department of Defense has primary responsibility
for reviewing the budget year programs submitted by the Unified CoBuaads. It
is in BOB that ail elements of the Military Assistance Program budget are
consolidated and reviewed by the Joint Chief£ of Staff, the Secretary of
Defense, the Director of Military Assistance, and the -military departments to
insure that military assistance planning dove-taxi;.; with our own military
1 j
planning*
The Department ate must evaluate the proposed MAP budget as to
foreign policy implications, while the Agency for International Development
evaluates the economic and technical aspects of the plan. In addition, and
before E&eeucive approval may be received, the Treasury Department, the Bureau












Agency, and the Office of Defense Mobilisation oust ail be given an
opportunity to express their views of the program consistent, of course, with
their appropriate responsibilities. It is the administrator of the Agency for
International Development who has the responsibility for the overall
coordination effort on the national level. Distribution for review of the plan
and program on the national level is reflected in Figure 15.
This "fully coordinated,, program is once again reviewed by the Bureau
of the Budget to insure that it is consistent with the overall operating and
fiscal programs of the Executive Branch* and is then forwarded to the
President for approval. Following Presidential approval, "Presentation Books"
arc prepared for use of the Congress during its scheduled hearings, these
books are organized on a country and regional basis and contain a summary of
past progress relative to program objectives as well as new budgetary requests.
Figure 16 illustrates the flow involved in the plan and program review
and approval process on the national level.
fonfircsslonal.Action $nd frhe .aepre^ami^ Process,
the Military Assistance Program budget submissions are included with
those for all other Defense Department programs.*" This means that the
*%his procedure, first reflected in the Mutual Security Act of 1959,
was reccfEBiended by a number of groups convened to study military assistance
and foreign aid in general, these include the Report on Foreign Policy and
Mutual Security prepared for the Sause Foreign Affairs Committee, in December,
1956, by its then Chairman and the Cossaittee staff; the Report to the President,
in March, 1957, by the President's Citisen Advisers on the Mutual Security
Program; the leport of the Committee on Morld Economic Practices, dated
January 22, 1959; and the Composite Beport to The President's Committee to Study
the United States Military Assistance Program, dated August 17, 1959.
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Secretary of Defease has primary responsibility for Justifying military
assistance before* the appropriate congressional committees. Although
Secretary McHamara in justifying the Fiscal tear 1962 MA? before the Senate
Appropriations Committee stated that economic aid and military aid are "not
competitive but compiemeutary, ,, he gave a strong argument for the $1,885
billion requested for military assistance* In concluding his testimony, he
Let me emphasitse the care that we used in arriving at this
final
.
figure, the items in the program were carefully selected,
first.' by tag and then fcy the. President* from a much longer list
which consisted of items for which our military advisors had
certified that a high priority military requirement existed. In
paring the list, 1 myself took particular pains to eliminate items
of sophisticated equipment where in my jud^aant the recipient
countries would not be capable of using this e<jnipment effectively
at least at the present time,
1 strongly urge that the Congress enact the proposed statute
under which the program will operate hereafter, and support the
request for $1,383 billion in new obligations! authority for
FY 1962.
It is cay jud^aent, as it is that of the President, that this
is a minimal estimate. It is still at rock bottom. i?
In addition to the Secretary of Defease* other responsible officers
are called upon to testify before congressional eosaaittees concerning various
elements of the program In both open and closed hearings. These include the
Secretary of State, Secretary of treasury, Administrator of AH>, Unified
Commanders, departmental chiefs, field representatives, and witnesses from
outside the government—all oust testify as to the advisability of adopting the
M .. ii.i . ill I . » I. H I Hul l I II I - I I L i! m i « .m i , 1 . 1 III II' II IHH III »l II III II . Mi iMiwinilil w i« »»
l?u-# S. Congress Senate, gca^nffl.t m,.Rt.&,. 3ft?.?* <>?» ,frfc*» P* i45 »
*or a detailed and comparative breakdown of the $1,385 billion reojuest by area,
category, and region j refer to Appendisees IV and V.
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program proposal as drafted. Figure 17 shove the key offices and agencies
involved in justifying the Military Assistance Program before Congress.
Following hearings and study by the congressional committees, the
program is usually modified before final passage by the Congress and subsequent
approval by the President. This modification or refinement action generally
includes a reduction in program requests which necessitates a second round of
review within the Executive Branch known as ''reprogramlag.
"
Aeprogrataing usually involves a reevaluation of priorities relative to
military objectives axtd changes in the International situation. This can
mean as little as an item adjustment or a major shift in program emphasis
in a particular country. In the process of reprograming, refinement documents
are exchanged between the Departments of State and Defense and the Agency for
International Development before the program can approach finalisation. It
must be recognised, however, that at no point in time are the specific
programs locleed-in. Military Assist**** Programs are in a constant state of
turmoil—a brush fire here and a Berlin build-up there! All of these
situations make itamediate demands for funds which generally means that some
plan and/or program has to be modified or dropped to make room for a new
crisis. As a result, there is a constant review and change process going on
at the three main levels of managements The Country MAAG, the tftiified Cociaand,
and in Washington.
Since programing involves a course of action designed to accomplish























pertinent that a review of the HAP budget formulation and refinement process
be summari;acd on a time-phased basis.
Beginning in December of each year, the Basic Planning Document,
Dollar Guideline and the Kiiitary Assistance Manual are forwarded to the field
with instructions to the Ifoified Commanders to develop a five-year plan from
which the first two years can be implemented as programs. This completed work
is due hack in Washington the following 3aly with complete iater*a®ency review
at the Washington level scheduled for accomplishment by no later than October.
At this point, work is commenced on the development of a congressional
presentation covering the first fiscal year of the five-year time frame. Shis
presentation is generally completed by December (a year has now transpired),
and presented to the Congress some time during the session immediately
following,
Usually the hearings in the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations
Committees begin in March and are followed bj Appropriations Committees
hearings in June and July, with a Foreign Aid Act forthcoming during the last
fifteen to thirty days of the session, this means, of course, that the funds
voted by Congress for the fiscal year in question have actually been
appropriated from one to two months subsequent to the beginning of the fiscal
year on I July.
As a general rule, the funds appropriated do not match those requested
and considered necessary for implementation**^ tola necessitates a review and
refinement process which involves the three military departments, the Joint
*% history of MAP Appropriation Legislation for the Fiscal Years
1950-1963 is included as Appendix VI.
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Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State, AID, and the Bureau of the Budget.
Concurrently, DOD solicit© the views of the Unified <kamaandere which is
essentially a "druthers action," i.e., they are asked what they would rather
have now since there is less money to spend. Of course, comments and
oqwaandations of the Unified Oasaaanders are then incorporated in a Defense
position with respect to this enforced and final refinement. If all goes
well, iiaplementatioii of this 'made to fit the shoe" Military Assistance Program
is commenced in late Hoveaaber or early December, or at approximately the mid-
way point of the fiscal year.
Meanwhile, two concurrent actions have been taking place. The second
fiscal year of the Five Year Plan is being worked over and developed into a
congressional presentation which swat be completed in ifovember and December
for submission to Congress during the following Januaty. As will be noted,
parallel plans and program cycles are going forward at all times, i.e., a
Five Year Plan and three fiscal years are "in the mill" simultaneously. As a
means of illustration, during April, 1S&2, the fiscal years 1962, 1963 and 1964
programs are being processed as follows:
Fiscal Year 1962 - Implementation
Fiscal Ktear 1963 • Presentation (to Congress)
Fiscal ¥ear 1964 * Planning aad Development
On completion of the review and refinement process, the Director of
Military Assistance approves a tentative current year program based on an
estimate of total fund availability, if *« , the current year appropriation,
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plus reappropriation, plus estimated recoupments from prior year programs and
other "savings. ,f This DOB approved Military Assistance Program is forwarded
to the Department of State for final coordination, and than issued to the
Unified Commanders for information pending the availability of funds,
Concurrently with the issuance of this program, the Director of Military
Assistance requests each t&tifled Ccwaaaader to provide him with a listing of
subprojects, by priority, that have bean recomoended for deferral pending
19
receipt of additional funds.
Based on this information from the field and coupled with the approved
financial plan, DGD requests an apportioauwat of funds from the Bureau of the
20
Budget. On receipt, an appropriate allocation of funds, along with
implementing instructions, la provided the military departments for execution
of their respective portions of the approved program. Figure 18 shows the
flow of approved plans and programs to the field for information and execution
respectively.
Military assistance funds granted to the military departments are
based on fully justified requests which have been prepared and submitted to
the Military Assistance Comptroller in accordance with special instructions
as may be issued from time to time. Funds allocated are of two basic types:
21
(a) those available for direct obligation, and (b) reimbursement funds.
X9
W4tffigy, .AffiSfrffETOe *fofflftl» £&-&&•> P» 31.
^""Xhis request is submitted in accordance with the provisions of the
Bureau of the Budget Circular No. A-34 utilising a consolidated "Apportionment
and Seapportionment Schedule,'' 1 BD Form 1105.
2lDepartment of Defease, DOB Instruction 72S0.1, Method of financing.
Funding Account, and jTxocal Import inp; for the Military Ass is tan, re Great Aid
Program , C'.'ashington: October 6, Wl), p. 3.
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Approved Plans and Programs to JCS for Information.
Approved Plans to Services for information; approved
Programs to Services for execution.
Approved Pland to Unified Commanders and CHMMAG for
guidance in preparation of future plans and progrsms.





Generally, direct obligation funds are used to procure material or
services that are not available from 0, 8. forces or stocks, laical ©simples
of projects or transactions requiring this type- funding are* Offshore
Procuresaent, Mutual Weapons Development, construction, transportation, etc.
Actually, the direct citation of funds method is identical with that used by
the regular U. S. forces in their day to day operations, likewise, the.
normal appropriation form of accounting i» usedj that is eofamitmeuts are
established at the time an order is issued j obligations are recorded at the
time contracts or other obligating documents are consunsaatedj mad expenditures
at the tins payments are made and summarised, ^2
Uhe second, or reimplement type of funding accounts for the major
portion of military assistance transactions. By this method, ceeiDonly called
"Common Item Order, " funds are made available for reisabursirvj military
appropriations upon delivery of e<|uipmeats and materials ^hich ^ere initially
procured by service funds, t&sder the Jiavy system* for' example, reimbursement
is effected at the time of delivery of military assistance items to either the
Haval Supply Center, Bayonne or the Havel Supply Center, Oakland for onsrard
shipraent to the ordering .country. Figure 19 jtt®vitki& an overall vies* of
Military Assistance Program funding vititin the Department of the Hevy.
As may be readily recognised, expenditure eatiaates for the Kiiitary
Assistance Program under CXO funding have greater significance than those for
most other programs because of the effect H&F expenditures have upon military
department appropriations md expenditure plana, Since reimbursement of
service appropriations is directly related to the rate of delivery, care ssust
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be exercised to insure that: an appropriation Is not Jmaobili&ad curing a
particular procurement period. Should such a situation be forecast in
sufficient; tine, fundi augmentations may be obtained upon request to the
Defense Department.
Because of the complexity of military assistance operations, the
numerous definitised rules and procedures involved, and the limited scope of
this paper, a more detailed discussion of the financing, funding, accounting,
and reporting under HftP will not; be undertaken. For the casual reader who may
be interested in pursuing this subject further, a listIns of DOB directives,
not previously referenced, but concerned with the details of accounting and
reporting under the many and varied aspects of the program is included as
Appendix VII. However, it is considered pertinent to this writing that
attention be focused on several important general provisions embodied in Part
III of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which serve to limit or modify
program execution:
a. Liquation on, Offshore
,
firoeui'eacnt . Procurement of military
assistance items outside the United States Is now limited to such procurements
as the President determines will not result in adverse effects upon the economy
of the United States or its industrial mobilisation base. In making this
determination, special consideration is to be given to any areas of labor
surplus and to the net position of the u". S. in its balance of payments with
24
the rest of the world. Although tnis provision applied to economic aid
23Department of the Air Force, Mftff. op. cit
. ,
p. 27.
^Section 604 of the FAA of 1961.
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under the old law, it is a first for military assistance.
b. Transfer ftffrween AffWM* ^^ President is authorised to transfer
up to iOX of the funds available for any purpose of the act to accomplish any
other purpose, this permits transfer from military to economic programs or
vice versa. The fund to which the transfer is made may not be increased by
more than 20%.^
e. Inspector Cjeaeral . The new act provides for an Inspector General,
Foreign Assistance, who reports directly to the Secretary of State and has
bread powers of investigation and evaluation of aid programs, including
26
military assistance. His is a powerful office and one which will
undoubtedly have a profound effect on prograta execution.^ 7
' i l i n. M l iwHI mil ) I m ill m.
Section oio of the FAa of 1961.
26Section 624(e) of the FM of 1961.
2716tt. M. Leffindwell, op. sit... p. 12.

cmmR v
uiLvmx Asai3msK3S-«Boos oa boondoggle?
^tr^due^pn,
Despite ita wide publicity and criticism, confusion and doubt
persist as to the purposes, operation and relative merits of the Military
Assistance Program, to a large measure, the misunderstandings and doubts
surrounding tbe program amy be attributed to throe readily recognisable
characteristics of military assistance: (1) the vtsttmtely complicated
machinery and organisation which has been perpetuated' for the management of
the programs (2) many of the important facts are either secret and unavailable
or they are of necessity masked to affect opinion both at home and abroad;
and (3) the impossibility of measuring, with precision, the consequences of
iailitary aid, For many of those .supposedly in the knot?, military assistance
is a painful necessity at best, and a downright giveaway at worst. It is the
purpose of this chapter to provide a sugary of arguments in support and
against MAF, program accomplishments, strengths as well as weaknesses, and
trends of the Military Assistance Program, i.e., a basis for decision as to




From the beginning it is significant to note that every President,
every Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, every Secretary of ZJefenae, and
every Secretary of State since 1949, has endorsed and supported military
assistance, and the Congress has annually appropriated funds for carrying
out the program. President Kennedy, in bis message of March 22, 1961,
before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, stated that
. . . military strength is a vital element in the timintenance
of stability amm$ emerging nations while tlaey are advancing
to higher and more adequate levels of social and &eonomic
veil-being**
President Eisenhower strongly supported l$U?. The following esccerpt from
his message to Congress in support of the fiscal year 1959 program clearly
indicates this support:
It is my duty to make clear my profound conviction that
the vigorous a^vaacetaent of this Program is our only logical
course. An alternative there is—to discontinue or sharply
reduce the Program—*but the consequences would be;
A severe dislocation and basic impairment of free world
1 j
A certain erunibling, under Sino-Soviet pressures, of our
stra overseas positions and a £« of these positions
progressively hack toward our emu
A iaass,ive increase in. our mm defense budget, in amounts
far exceeding mutual security appropriations, necessitating
substantial increases in taxes
j
A heavy increase in inductions of American youth into
our' o*m mzmd forces; and
Ultimately a beleaguered Americas her freedoms limited by
mounting defense costs, and. almost alone in a world dominated
by international ccR&smism.
i» l iiiipn imnMii nii man, iiiiw i .im ii'iii'» .» » mmm m i
.
i i u in mm n m n inrj i .
*Mau H. Laffingtroil, op,*,
,
cit. » » p. 2.
2




thoaa wfoo t#ould eonsidar this alternative to support of
our mutual security program must measure veil these
consequences . *
Siaca ite inception each successive cliairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff lias vigorously proclai&ed the necessity of the Military Assistance
Program. Typical of the statements made In support of MP by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff is that of the late General twining, USAF, who said:
The cold facts of the taattar are that the security of the
United States depend \>llective security att»
which, in turn, depends upon our military assistance program.
There laay he some alternative to collective security and
military assistance. Maybe those who make the broad charg©
that all MM i^it in this fl&H down the rat hole—»know
«hat that alternative is—but sc far no responsible military smn has
been abl ~:d
aimply don't have the manpower, the materiel or the moaay
to take on the entire defense of the free world ourselves and
the defense of the free world is a condition precedent to our
own defense. If a substantial part &£ the free falls or
slips behind the Iron Curtain, our chances of being able to
.iraclves diss, in proportion.
General Haacwall D. !Baylor, tJSA (ret.), who has been one of the moat
out: . . o£ the chalraen if the JCS also prescribed military aid programs,
"capable of developing Indigenous strength and confidence among our allies and
of assisting in the deterrence and defeat of Coramuniet aggressions," as an
asaential requirement of our "national militer/ proges©.""'
%itual Security Eroi?ram,
f
Fiscal Year 1959 (Washington: U. .
Gkjvernment Printing Office, 195S), p. 3.
4
Ibid., p. 23.
%«)R#*ll 0. Saylor, %hc, Uncertain trumpet (Hew York: Harper and
Brothers, i960), p. 32.
..-.:.-...:_:.
it
According to its supporters, military assistance is a sound investment
and one which is based on a solid foundation. !The cost of building an
equivalent amount of defensive strength in the world with our own forces
would require an expenditure of at least ten times the amount which Is
allocated to military aid." In addition, and apart from other considerations*
loss of any Izxportant part of the free world to communism would more than
likely result in defense expenditures that are greater than the total cost
of our Military Assistance Program. We can afford what is necessary for
military aid, but what we can't afford are the costs and risks involved in
abandoning this program so essential to our own security and that of the free
world*
For the atat. hich President Kennedy describes as "a decade of
development of which will depend, substantially, the kind of world in which we
a
and our children shall live," the concept of military aid is of even, greater
elgnifieance. it has only been during' the last year that the Cosraunists have
shown the capability to project their power thousands of miles beyond their
border—into Africa, and even into the Western Hemisphere. Prior to the
sixties they had limited this ability to areas contiguous to the Sino-Soviet
Bloc. Thus a new magnitude has been added to the Communist threat which
should further convince us of the tmod to maintain the aggregate lailitary
ctrength provided the United States and its allies through the Military
fiytigual Se^r^ty tefim.yjtfl^t 1*4? %956 (Washington* U. S.
Oovernsaent Printing Offie &) » p. 1.
Composite Report, cflfo ,<$& « « p. 13*





Frier to a discussion of the arguments against military assistance,
and there have baaa sway, a suciaary of the arguments that have been advanced
in recant years on behalf of foreign aid—of uhich military assistance has
constituted over e0&—is considered pertinent:
Helps build a strong free world alliance which is essential to % 3.
security.
Helps U. S. allies build adequate defenses vitbont imperiling their
trovides a wore economical defense for the United States in terns
money and aanpower.
Helps deter Soviet aggression and to aseet it store effectively if
deterrence should fail.
Helps raise living standards in the less developed areas and thus
stake CoBEouniflt eLsius lass attractive.
Helps insure continued access to vital rav materials.
Helps maintain strength for a Xsmfptam struggle with the Soviet bloc,
Raises living standards in the less developed areas and tints feel
lay the fouadatioa for a world of prosperity, political freedom, and
international cooperation*
Helps build seif-sustainins economies, including the defense
Ljmeat, in allied countric; -
^'General Lyman L. Leanitser, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
in testiEJcny be oafce hearings on Forai^n .ance and Related
Agen&ies Appropriations for 1962. See tf, S, Congress, Senate, Cosaaittee on
Appropriations, Beamings , on H. a. 9033, op. ci,fc .. ?. 150.
*:>i
Salps provide the United State© vita military based at strategic
points around the uorid.
Speeds up European defenses to neat the issaediate crisis, i.e., in
Berlin.
Helps develop a favorable attitude toward the United States,
Helps stimulate increased American private investments in under-
developed area^,
Helps increase American exports and develops markets lor future
exports in toe currently underdeveloped areas.
Helps provide ejaployeacat for Isjndreds of thousands of Americans.
Arguments against military assistance range all the way from virtually
unqualified opposition to virtually unqualified support, for the most part,
however, those wba oppose military aid believe that the l&xited States should
discount the tkoetd for strong allies and concentrate on its own military
.ength. This ''Portress America 1 ' concept has fceen repeatedly asserted as the
mast economical and at the same tiiae the neat effective solution to the basic
problem of American defense against Cosssisuaiet aggression. *
*$This list was compiled on the oasis of an cscariination of
presidential messages and congressional testimony hy leading administration
witnesses 1951 to j$Sf, See VtU^$2?%AmJhM* &**»* ***h 116. eft*. ,c,it ..
p« 33.
U«, S. Congress, Senate, ?QVGim.MA .gro^ram; Compilation, of, Stud
Surveys , iienate Document Ho. . fcfc Cong., 1st - . 1045.

Some critics claim that the major criterion in our $iving of military
aid Is that the countries be willing to accept it rather than express
political and military interests that are compatible with ours. This group
maintains tlmt it is not the Uhited States which has selectee' allies to serve
its interests, hut various countries have selected "Uncle Sam" to serve their
iat<. ^ary wherewithal. Without rational political
cLives, m are training sad eejuipping foreign armies with little thought
of the consequences that laay accrue, too often, this policy raises the
specter of militarism and the esspioitation of human aad matariai raaourcaa of
12
the recipient c for purposaa of war.
Other critics say that our aid programs create irritation. They
contend that American aid 1ms made more enemies than friends. For example,
Nehru, despite the hundreds of millions of dollars poured into India, tal
great delight in castigating toe Uhltod States while at the same time "wooing"
Russia. The Premier of Cambodia complains that U. S. aid dollars are being
used to buy hie country. neither tfaa French, Arabs or Israelis like u«
because we helped them with our aid programs.*^
She Shah of Iran, a supposedly strong Pro-Western advocate and the
recipient of millions in miliuery assistance, recently complained relative
to the defense posture of hie country. Said the Shall
:
in linn m ilium mm .um i ii rim l i I H i m i in m»< < i .. i...ii-»..i mm. ' 1 1 i m r r i I
12Grant s. McClellaa (ed.), U. S. Foreign Aid (ftew York; H. i .
Company, 1937), p. 45.
i3From article by Spruille Bradeu, former ttiited States Amfeaaaador to
Argentina, tTBillions for Blunders." American sierqtry
,
S&pteiabar, 1956, and as
-rintc.d by Grant S. KcCIellan, ibid * , pp. 36-37,
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aft we have saakes no sense. It it either too touch
too littie i too ranch for the needs of internal security, too
little to cope with foreign dangers.
She Soviet Stolen Is supplylag anas to Iraq and Afghanistan,
better and raore iao4era than those 00 far given to Iran by the
Halted States,*'*
Of the many critics of foreign aid, Eugene K, Castle is perhaps one of
the etoat vefaaaant in his convictions, lie gives eight specific reasons why he
believes the foreign aid program© of the Malted States are a potential threat
to the self-interest of this country. His eight reasons (not quoted word for
word) , which are shared by jaany opponents of foreign aid, are as follows*
(1) Our aid programs have grown up haphazardly without coordinated
relationship to any long-range national foreign policy. They have been
fomsalated on a crash basis, and improvised step by step as necessary to neat
the assersency of the day.
(2) Xhe continuance of foreign aid programs has beeoae a distinct
deterrent to the working out of a rational foreign policy since every saeve
is first predicated upon the seessiagly easy mthod of subsidisation of other
nations. A foreign policy of continuous handouts to insatiable "allies"
and '''neutralists" merely delays and tasks* were difficult the ultimate day
of reabonl.
(3) The United States Xnfoxmatiaa Ageaey 9 :{a $140-million-a-year cave
of winds," politically created and maintained, has hartaed instead of helped
the thinking of stilliaas of foreigner© who ware once our friends. It has,
on the other hand, served to reassure large numbers of toericaas that there
is no other course open 1 . that of dispersing our resources abroad.
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Post , March a, 1903,, p. &*15*

(4) After the initial crisis, foreign aid has all too oftea h&m&d
rather than aided the foreign country, this ia true becauaa it sullies
artificial prop® and. a«p$Kjrt» to the foreigner*** eaoj*»§r *3»ieh keep it in a
perpetual etate of falne expectation; Aral. dislocation,
(5) Foreign Aid pzosrata* iawive the United StAt*© directly and often
dangerously in otfpftoalvA situations thWMgjtout the t;orld, V« have frtitpsently
bea«« partisans la the Internal affairs A«a program* ef cauatriae that Arc
ipieata of military Aid,
(6) Tha coat of ferei$j aaaiatwia* epraade our own atreagfch to©
thinly, Genejaiat iteaaia kns*re the elementary military truth of the deadly
danger of dlffttaion; eid»©b©caeed kmxUm. hm not.
(7) The A»rieaa tajspayer cannot afford the everHaonntin® coot of the
foreign aid arogmaa. #or ©are. than two decadea, the Baited State* haa lived
in a defiHt eoeaoagr, thia situation csanofc continue vithottt pewaaeat harm
to mv econessio anil*baiiftg-
(0) &* <fe> not poaaaea the trained adalniBtrntive personnel to plan
and carry through foreign aid pregr»A8 affectively, the history of foreiga
aid has bean littered with the vrMtaga and rubble of tneonpataot and
mwteful adniaiatxatiea* 5
Before leaving Hr, Castle and hia views on foreign aid, a ••choice"
quota in considered fmrtineat to this aeetlon on axpaanta againat HWP glvtag*
5fIfer any gwnrniaaat to eemcijaie to borrow r*»ey in ardor to give it away,
la an act of laeredible §§i$y****®
"" " " '' ' " "• ' " " " "" >".».! "•"- .... - —.....—-.,....— .im ,,i„,., .,, mi, , i , , ..
T
,. „,, -,„ rr .,.,,. — r , f„r ..... , _. r . v ..„ | t | f | , T | L . , | L ^
ISsngea* ft Caetle* OftllVci^« . pp. 8§fi$
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the effectiveness of the Military Assistance Program can only be
evaluated within the total contest of U, S. Foreign Policy—a policy that
taust measure up to a twofold test:
First, it must preveat say diminution of relative United
States military Strang - si.cn sight encourage a potentially
hostile power to conclude r that it mi^bt 'Via" a big
.:: or that it could threaten or force. us into degenerative
step-by-step appeasement and isolation. Further, Waited States
po: i£te likelihood of war by -alculation"
;
and it must give us the capability to via a war, should one be
forced on us, on politically advantageous tarts*.
,.oad, our strategy must not rehire us, in order to
rve a Stan poiHMF* to sustain i
corrosive of our ceatral values, procedures, and Institutions,
mid the dilcspraa of being forced, for the sake of
survival, to stunt our vitality as a free society, 1 '
Any foreign policy which falls either of these tests is not ndaoaate to the
18
national interest of the United States, However, the development of
criteria with which to gajga the success of military assistance is extrenely
to support a system of deterrents, the ultimate test of success must of
necessity revolve down to actual warfare. For this reason, a peace time
evaluation of military assistance must be predicated on judgGwats and
interpretations rather than on the basis of scientific jpeasurawents. If AM
an appraisal is to be made of the Military Assistance Program, the security
interests of the Waited States mist be emphasised above all other consider-
ations ; keeping in mind that the less sigaifleant the questioa to be
'iwiMW—Hw Hel ium i»m«iii»Mnp«nwwm— iii»i 'H>«iw | i inn. >**—** » * '! » «>»inm«ii i—wNwok i.wi fc ni»>nii^ i ninMpil .w
i7
^uoted from She,, Ob|e^|vof, „?£; Mfegfl 3,W^ $<#mtifi Assistance
,rano > a £tudy by Hhe Center for International Studies, Hassa . ..







evaluated, the clearer the answer attainable.
It has been stated that for a military i ance program to approach
ectiveaess it should possess £ftt general characteristics. 1 ' Km
characteristics, then, have been selected to serve as the basis for an
evaluation of the Hilitary Assistance Program aa authorised by the foreign
Assistance Act of 1961.
1. Defease vp« £&F &;pend£fcurcs . The premise here is that whatever
level of sacrifice the U. s« accepts for the raaintenanee and promotion of
eattonal security, allocation between expenditures on our own forces and on
foreign aid should he such -that the last dollar apent on each purchases a
comparable amount of benefit to our foreign and military policy objectives.
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, specifically stipulates that the
Military Assistance Program sust coma Into direct competition for financial
suxjport with other activities of the Departxaent of Defense.^" To this
proviso, Secretary Hclfesaarc lias indicated his unqualified support. Be
Indicated before the Senate Appropriations Committee that he was impressed
with the contribution that the Military Assistance Pro-gran has made to the
flexibility of our mm military planning, and stated that "our military aid
21
to other countries must be a part of our oves>all defease plans, ?! BMMl
Lemaitser, Ghaixiaftti of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated before the saras
eoxaaittec that,
ii i in ii . in m i' in i H i h i ni l 111111111 1 » m I i m i in . an ii«w—»ii i no i m i urn , i n in i n a nmn » » i»
lWe^mA^ groflraa, Ccflp&laftfryi of Studies an# Surveys, op. cit,
,
p. %4,
cation 304, FAA of 1961.
**& S. Congress, Senate, ^fflffia,,, o&$. ^ SOff, op,f cit., p. 1
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Ho mount of saoney apeat on our I i oouid give tip
United States a cosapv . i asset a£ trained, well equlppc
forces, familiar with the terrain, and in suitable position
for icaaediafc® rosittrace to local aggaaeseion. ?—
la this conaectioss it is interesting to note the relatively low eoat per
aon of allied forces as cosapared with, the costs of mintaAning Qnitetf States
forces overseas. Figure 20 presents such a comparison by country, for the
years 1959-1961.
Although there lias been, a eo%a»fcjard trend in I3AP expenditures in
comparison with major U. 3. national security expenditures (see Figure 21),
during the first seven years of the program, the United States helped to
achieve a free world def | .mature of sea and air forces nearly equal in
Blm to those of the United States, and ground forces ten tixam the- nusaarical
strength of active United States ground forces, Iftis was aceanpllshed with
a total l&P outlay on the part of the lloifced States of lass than $16
billion. 23
*« ^,%t,3ffl z° fo, 3. Hatioaa^, gojiffy ^ WHim frW$?&r» fl he
active the program must be based on fcbe SiBae assumptions regarding the
probable enemies, their intentions and capabilities, as tiiose which underlie
the eise, eo^osition am! character of our ow arsac-d forces.
Although current country figures and e<$uiptaenc plans ere classified,
Secretary HoSamara indicated that the projected military assia^ance programs
are an integral part of the nm eiaf&asis on Baited Stages strategic forces
»* t**««~<mm ,mwh**<# mm mi">iiwiW'WiwW1i* i>'»i.i»'ii»-'»"*-*< » imw mmm>m*M**mtm»mmm+ »*m0*!mi>**'w wmwn «pm»miihi
22Xbid. . p. 149.
°Forei£sn Aid Froftram*. Oqsspilation of Studios and Survevs, 00* cit.,
p. 10C4. See Appendix VTX for an on-lx*ard, aowctaty iiweutory of HA?
esguipraent and supplies in thirty-seven principal countries as of 30 June 1961.
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which can ride out a nuclear attack; on cousaand ami control of nuclear
weapons; increased and wore mobile non-nuclear forces; and on special
retirements such as necessitated by the Berlin crista. According to
Secretary of iefense, our allies will be capable of meeting the cossetition
24
of the build-up in Gaammist p&mz squarely and effectively.'*
3. Coord.foaMm n*$> FTOto JftMRT* ** •**• w«,<^> •» effective
tiilitary assistance program must make political and economic, as well as
military, sense.
The Foreign Assistance Ant of 1&61, strengthens the position of the
State J)epartraent on the policy level of military assistance planning, and
specifically make© the Secretary of State responsible "for tile continuous
supervision and general direction" of assistance programs, the Secretary of
State must not only insure chat military assistance conforms to foreign
policy but he mast also assure that program of military assistance and
economic assistance are mutually supporting and not in conflict t**ith each
other. In addition, program caordinatioa between the Director of Hilitary
Assistance and the Agency for International Developjaeat must be accomplished
under the supervision of the Department of State.
4. gorwrsrd Planning , An effective military assistance program must
involve as little improvisation as possible and, therefore, should he
forward-planned on a three to five year basis.
Hilitary assistance plans are now five year, time-phased schedules of
actions, they are developed with the intended purpose of assuring that SBSJ?
2*0. 8. Congress, Senate, flffjtipffl, ^^.1,,,'^ 9?,; fiM>» ?• ^2*

9B
provides direct support to U. S. juilitary and foreign policy objective**
Further, plans arc revised ansnally m& projected an additional year to
taaintain the five-year projection. Although Congress did not approve the
current administration's request for a permanent or continuing authorisation
for foreign aid, the ma legislation does author&ac on appropriation for two
consecutive years. Shis increase in fund, antnorisation provides a certain
sieasure of continuity and efficiency in the aseeution of the program that did
not exist under previous legislation,
*< %<f^ty
,ffiff M!^lJW,ftmsmfa «iUtary assistance can only
achieve result® if it is bm&& on a broad consensus as to overall policy,
strategic principles, and burden snaring,
the restrictions placed on the granting of military assistance hy she
turn act serve to saalntaia and jfiflmMf interallied consensus* 1!he Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, states that no &&i®mw, articles shall be furnished on
a grant basis to any country at a cost in excess of $5.0 taillion in any
fiscal year unless the President determines, anoa@ other things, that such
country conforms to the purposes and principles of the charter of the IJfeited
Nations; that equipments furnished v&U fee used for the defense of the free
World; and that the increased ability of audi country to defend itself is
important to the security of the Baited States,'25 As to taden sharing,
there has been a tmrlcad increase particularly with respect to the JtoSX)
countries* Figure 22 shows the current percentage of country contriljntions
ist support of International Beadtparters, and .as will he resiesahered, Figure
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highlighted the upward tread of W&Q country crcpe»dlturco for defense ee
compared with a gradual decrease in military assistance to these countries,
6. Extent, of, foblic Jud$^n
,
t . Xt is important that public ju&gtaeat
be made saore sensitive to the underlying needs for military assistance,
this necessary requircfaeal; for an affective Military Assistance
Program sponsored by a desaocracy such as ours has too often been overlooked,
The average American does not relate his am security to sailltary assistance,
but rather, he frequently diaaiasce it as a "giveaway,"26 A pjfrff York "£,&$$
ravicv of President Kennedy** Kerch 22, 1961, aessa&e to Congress on Foreign
Aid int i that the seeming lack of understanding of the overall problem
27
u>' Congress and the public "presents an obstacle of isaposing dissensions,*'
Hr. ?eter Bason, in an editorial on foreign &£d, stated that a Kijmv job of
the new Director of AED is "to isaprove the foreign aid image at haae by
convincing Confess and the Asterieaa public that they are getting value
received instead of a booadogsle.''**"
Hius £ar the publicity on foreign aid has not been, balanced, but tends
center on the flag's and taistakee of the various programs. For scampic,
an article entitied* "Hillieas in ttoeociaitted Aid Funds Salted torn? Abroad,
Probers Find," appeared in the ae&s^ at the tirae Congress was considering
2%3sapasitc Iteporfc, oa» feit ,« p. 170,
~%e, yyliiftmfrpq ftftUffi ,««70» Ksrch 12, 1962, p. 25.
- Uash£a££cm. goat. , March 25, 196t« p, 1.
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President Kennedy's 1963 Foreign Aid Message, this article, and others like
it, place the iiilitary Assistance Prograta in an unfavorable light at a taost
inopportune tiiae. Of interest is the "reported" balances of expended,
unexpended and new funds for the fiscal years 1350 throng* 1963 as reflected
by the chart in Appendix VIII. This data indicates that a "norm!" balance
has existed beeueco the various categories of loads since fiscal ,y>ear
According to the Draper Cossaittee the successes of MAE have far
Otttueigsbed toe failures—the instructive results achieved attest to this
•art
fact. However, "Jtohu Q. Public*' has not been so infonaed.
With the possible exception of long^tera tad authorisations , the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1901, as conceived and enacted, provides the
organisational structure and "tools'* considered by nost authorities as
accessary lor effective laaaaseoe&t of an efficient Military Assistance
Program* However, a jacaaingful evaluation of operations under this new
legislation i& virtually precluded due to adiaiaistrative delays in
fcapicsaeatation.
First, Congress took longer than expected to enact the nev Xma and
to appropriate funds for its execution* Hare delays resulted from the fact
that nev Kennedy-recruited administrators and their assistants did not






For esaraple, 2ir. Fouler Hamilton, the director of the new *'maiu spring"
agency, AID, has been on the job less than siss months, Sie number two AID jaan,
Procter sod Gamble esacutive vice president Walter I*. I4»gie# Jr. , reported
for work on March 1, l%2-"»ci^Ut months after the "neginalng of the fiscal
year. It was not until April 3, 1963, that President Kennedy appointed
John K. Jtasfleld, Staff JHrector of a Saaafce Snoeoaaittae on Ooverapent
Poiicyuakins, to man the new Inspector General, Foreign Assistance billet.
Beepitc the delays is Is apparent that the iltms approach with new
concepte° is moving in the ?lgfrt direction* la the short time he has heea
a&eare, ilr. Eamiltoa has streamlined his top cacnand and reduced the overhead.
fih has recced his deputies to two and further cut the AW hierarchy to
tt-*elve appointive and fifty-one eupar»grade civil service jobs. In addition,
he is hand-picking eleven new regionai directory and fti£&'*n1m mission
chiefs, all recompensed by industry &&& eaperienced in the countries to yhich
they -./ill he assisted.
Already, a fcougtatr ytaad has keen tahea in dispensing foreign
.Istaaee. Jays Director Hamilton* "Sleaey m& progress march along together.
31
If our retirements aren*t met for each Stage, they don't get the money."
'
Shis stand is evidenced by the fact that AW has consistently held up fund
allocations until assurances are received that the prostatas In recipient
countries are sound and will be run right. Specifically, foreign aid
projects in ivoroa have been cut frost 51 to 20; in Indonesia, 17 out of 41
projects have been eliminated; and in Libya, 21 out of 32 have ceased to
31




Although the above consideratiom are hopeful signs of tighter
administration and better maaasement for our foreign aid program, it is
difficult to determine just how effective the integration of all programs,
i.e., economic, military and political under one agency will be. Secretary
of Defense Ildtaara has avowed his unqualified support of the u*y integrated
approach; however, it must be noted that although previous legislation
placed authority over the Military Aosiotgnce Program within the State
Department, ovidenee indicates that tbJu* arrangeaaent led to friction, delay,
and uncoordinated policy and program ^sidelines being issued separately and
at different times.
As to the value of a Military Assistance Program per so. it can be
said that despite all of its previous shortcomings it has succeeded in
building up the free world perimeter against the Comrauuist forces menacing it.
the basic need is for the American public to rocogoi&e that our continued
participation in the strengthening of a free world eemsaunity of nations is
vital to our mm security. Froperly cKpipped, the free world nations present
a combined strength that the Cassmsnist world cannot beg&» to notch!
J2
^P, M,*.^W ^gff^> m*cb M* ®&* P« I4 «

KM of abb&V2A330N9
AID Agency for International Bcvelopraeat
AS3D(23A> Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security
Affairs)
iw Bureau of the Bu4§et
EPS Baeic Pl&ming IkMsusstssat
3UDUD Bureau of the Budget
I3CCH Caribbean Ctoexaand
CHG Chief of toal Operation©
DGD Departiaeat of Defense
EGfc Reonccsic Cooperation A<-
EUCCK European Cooaand
ISM Forci^rt Assistance Aet of 1061
5CA Foreign Operation© Atfetaistratiou
GAD General Accounting Office (Controller General)
ICA International Cooperation Adaixxl. m
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff





mi The Hititery Assistance Program
SSE&P Mutual Defease Assistance Program
Ml The Mutual Security Act
MSKS ISufcual Security Military Sale®
Mffi North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
KSC National Security Council
<&&> Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
amw Office of the Chief of Naval Operation©
OSB Office of the Secretary of Defense
BACCH Pacific Cocmad
HEAD Political Advisor (State Department)
SEC2DE? Secretary of Decease
VC Unified CoRjaand
ySIA United States Information Agency
USCH Qaite4 States- Operations Mission

OF COCSEIftTJOtl 8ETHEEU 22E TJHTBBJ) Sl&ttS AHD S0BKSY
AG3SEHBHC OF GOC&EBMCXQH SE1HE&K 2KE GOmitMm Of WB IJWXBH) iiXOTS
Of AHBBICA AH) UBS GOVESatOTr OF 3SJ8KEY:
1fce Oovesnsactit of the Halted States of &acrica and the (kwcnara«aat o£
talsey,
Desiring to ix^leraent the Seeleration in vhich they associated
themselves at I«on4on on July 26, 1950s
Consider&ng that under Article I of the Pact of Hu&uai Cooperation
Ginned at 8a$idad on February 24, 1955, the parties signatory thereto agree
to cooperate lor their security and defease, and that* similarly, a*> stated
in the atxrwe-oentioned Soclaratioa, the Govcratatttit of the United States of
Acserica, ia the interest of wrid peace, agreed feg cooperate with the
Ooverwaenta making that Declaration for their security and defense;
Recalling that, ia the a^^ve-^aeatiomd Beciaration., the lacja&exa of
the Pact if Hutu&l Co-.. ion. iaakiag that Declaration affirmed their
dDtoxniaBtism to siaintaia their collective security m& to resist aggression,
-.'act or indirect;.
Considering further that the Gtevexaaeat of the United Statea of
Asaerica is associated with the writ of the taajer caultteas ©i* the Fact o£




Desiring to strengthen peace in accordance \?ith tlse principles of the
Charter of the United Nations;
Affiraiag their richt to cooperate for their security and defease in
accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the Ifciitod nations,
Ceneiderins that the Govemtaent of the United States of Ataeriee
regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the preservation
of the independence end integrity of lurkey;
Eeeognising the authorisation to furnish appropriate assistance
granted to the President of the United States of America by the Congress of
United States of America in the Mutual Security Act of 1934, as anended,
and in the Joint Resolution to Promote ? ace and Stability in the tliddle East;
Considering that siailar agrceatents are being entered into by the
(Sovernaent of the United States of America and the Osverisaents of Iran and
Fahistan, respectively,
Have agreed as follows
Aienca£ i
She ^verwaent of TwSmp is detemined to resist aggression. in case
of ago^ea»ion aggai&iit Pricey, the Oovernroent of the United States of itiaerica,
in accordance with the Constitution of the Itoited States of Atactica., will
tafee such appropriate action, including the use of amed forces, as may be
outually agreed upon and as is envisaged in the Joint Eesolutlon to Promote





The Owcsmaejafc of the United States of Asaerica, In accordance with
the ilutual Security Act of 1954 , as amended, and related lavs of the United
-atca of Aiaerica* and with applicable a£p.*eeraeats heretofore or hereafter
entered into between the Gcwrnxsaoat: of the Halted States of ikaerica and the
Government of Turkey, reafflnas that it will coutinsifi to furnish the
Govertsaent of Turkey such tstlitary and economic assistance as may he autu&lly
agreed upon between the Govemetent of the United States of jtaeriea and the
Govenraeat of TUrl&ey, in order to assist the Government of TUXfeey is the
preservation of its national independence and integrity and In the effective
promotion of its acancnic developoent,
AilTICXE III
The Govarnaaat of Tux&ey undertakes to utilise such military and
ceoncciic assistance as saay he provided by the Government of the Halted States
of America In a sssaaar consonant with the alias and purposes sat forth by the
Governments associated in the Iteclaration signed at London on %asly 20, V.
and for the purpose of effectively prompting the acoacaale development of
Suris&y and of preserving its national Independence and integrity*
The Government of the United States of Aoearica and the (SoveiTiaent of
jRirlcey will cooperate with the other Governments associated in the
Declaration signed at London on July 2S, 1958, in order to prepare and
participate in such defensive arraageioaauts as yaay be mutually agreed to be




The provision*? of the present Agreement do not affect the cooperation
between the two Goveranents as envisaged in other international agrecsaeatg
or arrangcaaeats.
This Agreesient shall enter into fore® upon the date of its signature
and shall continue in force until one .year after the receipt by either
OovernEsant of vnetttm notice of the Intention of the other Gmmrsmm^ to
terminate the Aseecaaeat,
Pone in plicate at Ankara, this fifth day of Harch, 1959.
tfor the Governesent of the Qnitad States of Aaeriea*




imvEL scsmm wm offices** Avmirnxm tm vm mv&L
smnx rammem coosss for $eui£& mmms
(all tfcje £» local time)
12:00 man * Depart: liotel Soger Soldi, 13th Street ax*& Peaosylvaaia
Avenue, H. W., to&iagtea, B.
€, , via chartered
lift
3:00 p.m. • Arrive: Governor Hotel, Sterisbarg, taRsylvaoia,
Win i m ,/flirt i^^iwfS^^ ii nniSttiA
2:00 p.sa, - Depart: Govaraer Sbfeel» Sarrisburg, Penueylvaaia, via
dttrtes&dl bus
6:00 p.m. * Arrive: Towers Sotel, 23 Claris Street, Brookiva, lieu Ifork
2:00 p.m. * Depart: Building 02, $aval Supply Center, Boyowa, Sew
Jvzmy, via efcarfeareo' bus
8:00 p.sa. - Arrive: Bachelor Officer© '-iuarters, Buildiag 71, Steval
Station, lleuporfc* Sgjo4a Xels&d
9:15 a«a. # Depart: ilaval Mr Station, (juooset Point, Bljoie Island,
via U. S. Goversswmt aircraft




wmw - ?q October im
3:30 a.m. - Depart: Patricia Bay Airport, Victoria, British Columbia,
Canada, via aircraft
Midnight - Arrives Washington, D. C.
s^nda? - ^ otopr jw
1:00 p.m. - Depart: Naval Air Station, Anacoatia, D. C, via U. S.
Government aircraft
6:00 p.m. * Arrive: Naval Air Station, Penoacola, Florida
S^NDA? - 5 MOypHBBR im
9:00 a.m. • Depart: New Orleans, Louisiana, via U. I, Government
aircraft
3:00 p.m. - Arrive: Naval Air Station, Norfolk, Virginia
SATKfftt? - XI HOWpffiftW
5:45 p.tu * Depart: Bachelor Officers garters, Building A-51,
Naval Station, Norfolk, Virginia, via chartered
bus
11:30 p.m. » Arrive: Hotel Soger Smith, 13th Street and Pennsylvania
Avenue, N. w., Washington, D. C.

APPENDIX IV




L ?y Area - ffotft* $l t885.p (USUI
Europe 414.7 629.3
Africa 4S.2 31.9
Near Ease It South Asia 433.5 406.6





IX. By Category - Tota.1 llttfat
Essentially Fixed Charges 2&4 Jftg
Infrastructure 76.1 90.0
International Military Hdors & Agencies 11.3 11.0
Training 122.5 121.0
Supply Operations 141.4 15B.9
Administrative Expenses 25.0 24.7
Force Maintenance m.a yiti
Spare Parte 340.6 318.3
Attrition, Training Atmtnition,
Repair and Rehabilitation of
Equipment 292.5 184.1
Other Consumables 107.6 123.6
Force liraprovenjent MM mu
Aircraft 253.1 148.3
Ships 49.4 75.6
Tanks, Vehicles and Weapons 67.7 50.9
Missiles 135.6 201.7
Electronics and Cocsaunication 18.4 69.1
Special Programs 94.4 61.6
Construction 59.6 60.8







III. HKTO Only - Tota*
Europe (NMX> Country Programs)
Bear East (Greece and Turkey Only)
HkTO Infrastructure
S&TO International Military Hdqrs
and Agencies
Weapons Production Program
Mutual Weapons Development Program
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BOD Directive 2110.24, "Basic Principles nod Policies Relating to the
Provisions of Section 1GS, Public Lav 208, 84th Congress, 'Mutual
Security Appropriation Act, 1956,*" as amended.
mmmmt0mmmmm 4000.1$, "Basic Policies and Principles for Interservice Support."
4140,13, "Policies for the transfer of Department of Defense Supply
Systcn Inventories."




722Q.2» "Obligations for Materiel to be Delivered from Stock*"
7220.6. "Prerequisites for Recording «ad Report:ing of Obligations."
7420.1. "Regulations Governing Stock Fund Operations."
.7510.1, "Uniform Pricing Policy for Haterials, Supplies, and
Equipment Financed by Killtary Appropriated Funds,"
D0D Instruction 2110.30, "Accounting mid Control of Barter Transactions
Authorised by Section 305(a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, aa
amended.
"
7230.5, "Budgeting, Funding mtd Accounting for Appropriation
Reimbursements .
"
7240.1, "fidgeting and Accounting Policies and Procedures for
Interdepartmental Purchase Re<juests, Requisitions, Orders, etc."
7230.3, "Import, Analysis of Appropriation Status by Activity and/or




7250.7, "Honthly Reports on Budget Statu©," {W Form 1176),
7420.4, "Constructive Kethoe* of Billing Within the Department of
Defense for Sale of Materiel in the Military Supply Distribution System."
7510.4, "Uniform Policy for Charging Accessorial Costs Incident to
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